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232 GOSPEL ARMY V. CITY OF Los ANGELES [27 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18808. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1945.) 
'THE GOSPEL ARMY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Appellants . ., 
[1] Secondhand Merchandise-brdinance.-A city ordinance re-
quiring junk and seconill2and dealers to procure permits, to file 
reports of goods bought or t&eeived, describing the goods and 
the seller, and to retain the go'ods for from 3 to 21 days before 
disposing thereof. is reasonable. ' .. 
[2] Religious Societies-Municipal Regillations.-A city ordinance 
regulating junk and secondhand dealers is applicable to a 
religious organization which procures donations of money and 
articles of value in prosecution of its religious work. 
[8] Charities-Municipal control-Soliciting.-Los Angeles Mu~ 
nicipal Code. ~§ 44.01-44.19, requiring permits to solicit funds 
for charity. is not undnly burdemmme or unreasonable. 
[4] Religious Societies-Municipal B.egulations-Soliciting.-An 
ordinance regulating the solicitation of charitable contribu-
tions applies to a religious organization soliciting funds for 
charitable purposes as part of its relilcious duties, and is Dot 
on that account obje<ltionable as abridgine: its religious liberty. 
[5a,5b] Id.-Municipal B.egulatioD&--8oliciting.-The requirement 
of an ordinance regulating solicitation of charitable contribu-
tions that promoters and solicitors submit proof of their good 
character and reputation is not subject to the objections that 
it discriminates against religious organizations. censors their 
religious beliefs. or vests arbitrary power in t!te board admin-
istering it to withhold " lieense if not sati!:f\ed that the appli-
cant is of good character and reputation. Nor is a provision 
for revocation of II license for unfair practices' of solicitation 
objectionable a!' affording- an opportunity for censorship of 
religoious beliefI'. 
[1] Regulation of junk dealers, see notes, SO A.L.R. 1427; 88 
A.L.R.970. See. III so. 7 Cal.,Tur. 10-Yr. Supp. 366; 33 Am.,Tm. 336; 
47 Am.,Tur. 555. 
[4) Regulating solicitatiun of alms and charitable contributions, 
see notes. 57 A.L.R. 516: 128 A.L.R. 1361. 
(5) Ordinances vesting discretion in officials, see notes, 12 A.L.R. 
1435; 54 A.L.R. 1104.92 A.L.R. 400. See. also. 16 Cal..Tur. 230. 33 
Am.,Tur. 377. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Secondhand Merchandise; [2. 4. 5] 
Religious Societies, § 12; [3] Charities, § 38; [6] Licenses, 136. 
./ 
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[6] Licenses-Amou..'lt.-A license fee ~overiDg the expenMS of in-
vestil!'lltionl" Ilno aominh;tratio...f iR res!;onahle. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles Count.y. Haroli! R .Tpffery .• Tlld~~ Reversed. 
Action to enjoin 6l1forcement of ordinances regulating 
transactions in secondhand goods and solicitations for chari-
table purposes. .Tudgment for plalnt.lff reversed . 
.. 
Ray L. Chesebro, Cit;\7 Attorney. Frederick von Schrader, 
Assistant City Attorney, and Wilbur Bassett, Deputy City 
Attorney, for Appellants. 
Robert H. Wallis for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Certain ordinances of the City of Los An-
geles regulate transact.ions in Recondhand goods and solicita-
tions for charitable purposes. Plaintiff. an incorporated 
religious organization. hrom!ht this snit to enjoin the enforce-
ment of these ordimmces as applied to it on the ground they 
abridged its religion!' liberty in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States and t.he r.onsthl1tion of Clllifornia. The 
trial court found t.hllt nllllntiff i~ "em!II!.!p.d ex('ll1!;lvelv in the 
promulgation. by litprllture lind word of mOllth. of if.R relig-
ious beliefs. by lind t.hr011<rh its 1I1lXilillrles. IIni! in the procur-
ing of donlltions in the form of monev an(l article!' of value 
in the prO!~ecl1tion ani! furthpl'lInce of 'its relilrious activities." 
It enjoined defendants from "further interieren('e and threat-
ened acts. which WOl1J(1 in IInv way prevent the free exercise 
of the religio1l!' Iiherty Ani! freedom of worship of the said 
Plaintiff." Defendants appeal. 
The findin/? of the trilll court must be viewed in the light 
of the evidence. which is nndi!:lputed. Religious services at 
plaintiff's miRSion Rre condu('ted by a minister ordained by it 
whose compensation depenil!' entirely on solicited contn1>l1-
tions. Plaintiff enga~e!'l ;n missionary work. di!!tributes the 
New Testament a.nd religiolls t.racts free to the public. and 
gives assistance to those in need. It collectA salvage from the 
pub1i(' to obtain fllni!~ to Tlronalrnte ;tA religious dOctrines and 
to provide aiil to the poor. Some of the 88lvage ill sold in a 
secondhand good~ ~or(> nnerllted hy plaintiff; !lome. such as 
clothing, is distributed to the poor; goods not suitable for 
) 
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furthl'r nse go directly to a salvage mill. The salvage is 
eo11eeted b~· plaintiff's "indllf1triIl1 soliritors" in four of plain-
tiff's trnrks. 1'hl' money rrceiv('(l from the sale of seeonclhand 
goods in plaintiff's 8to;e is TIseo to meet the cost of operllting 
thr !o1tore. inr1noing,thl' romncms/ltion paio to the mana<.!er and 
t111' ~o1i('itors. \Vhatf'ver remllin!' is paii! into plaintiff's treas-
nl'~·. ~inet~· per eent of t.lft. money re('Pivei! for thl' mill 
m:l1eria1 gops to thp orh·pl'R of thl' trll{'ks: thl' rrmllindpr is 
tnrnl'o oyer to t11P mllnlH!PT of thl' store for plllir.tiff's treasury. 
Othl'r employees of plaintiff 'lolirit mone~' from the public. 
Solicitors make the obie('t of thpir mission known by showing 
to prospertive donors a printed card ~tating that "the bearer 
whosl' ~ignature is herein attached for identifieation is duly 
authorizeo to solieit monev, food. clothing or anv other useful 
articles that will hf'ln th~ /1ospel Arm:r ·to carry' on their re-
religious home missionary ani! evangelical work among the 
poor and under-privileged." Abont fifty per cent of the fund!! 
raised is absorbed by the cost of soliciting, including the com-
pensation of the solieitors, which is paid on a percentage 
basis. The funds remaininQ' are nsed t.o pay the eost of fur-
nishing tracts and rp1igiom: literature free to the publie and 
to Rupply food. lodcin/!. ('lothing and car fare to the poor. 
[1] Section 24.01 of the T.JOs Angeles Municipal Code de-
fines a "junk dealer" as "a person having a fixed placf' of 
business in this City who /!oes from house to house or from 
place to place. !?Ilthering. eol1f'cting. buying, selling or other-
wise dealin/! in any 010 rll~. sacks. bottles. cans, paper, metal 
or other artie.]es commonl~' known a!: junk." A "secondhand 
dealer" is "a person p.ngaging in. conducting, manlll!1ng-. or 
carrying on thf' busint:'ss of buying. selling or otherwise deal-
ing in secondhand goods. ware!: or merchandise." Junk dealers 
and secondhand dealf'r!' mnst obtain a permit to engage in 
busines!': from defendant eitv's Hoard of Police Commis.<;ioners. 
The following "Requisitf's 'of Permits" are set forth in sub-
section (a) of Seetion 24.01; .. (]) Persons de."Iiring to obtain 
a permit to conduct, manage or deal in any busines." men-
tioned in subsection 'a' (If thi!: Section shall file an application 
in writin/! with tht:' Hoaro ~pecifyin/! by ~treet and number 
the place where sneh hmlines!': is proposed to be condueted or 
carried on: junk oollpl'tors havin/! no fixed place of busine.'lS 
!lhall Rpecify in such application their re.'lidence by lrtreet 
number. The application shall be mgned by the applieant and 
shall contain his residence address .. (2) Before receiving an 
/) 
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application for any permit the Board shall require the pay-
ment of such fees as are hereafter specified. (3) Upon receipt 
of such application the B6ard shall cause to be investigated 
the business of the applicant and 10catioIl at which applicant 
proposes to engage in b~sin('ss as specified in said application. 
Thereafter the Board may issue ~,,:.permit to the applicant 
which shall be effeethe for the remaining p(}rtion of the cur-
rent year. (4) Persons operating unner the provisions of 
this Section shall be required to secure an annual renewal 
of such permit commencing 'January 1st of the succecding 
year in which such permit was granted. (5) ~o person holding 
a permit to conduct. manage, earry on or deal in any business 
mentioned in subseetion 'a' of this Section shan buy, sen or 
otherwise deal in secondhand jewelry, precious stones, pre-
cious metals (including old gold), watches or other similar 
secondhand merchandise without first applying for and, reo 
ceiving a special permit therefor from the Board in the man-
ner provided in this Section for securing ordinary permits." 
The fees prescribed are set forth in subsection (d):" (1) Ap-
plications for permits other than. provided for in this sub-
section shall pay the sum provided in Section 22.10; (2) 
Applications for special permits. the sum of $50.00: (3) Ap-
plications for annual permit renewal, the sum of $25.00: (4) 
Applications for changing location of place of business for 
which a permit has been granted, the sum of $10.00; (5) 
Change of ownership, the sum of $10.00, to be applicable 
only in eases where the new owner is already operating under 
a permit issued pursuant to provisions of this Section." Sub-
section (e) provides: "( 1) The Board shall not grant any 
permit provided for in this Section to persons who fail, refuse 
or neglect to comply with the laws and ordinances relating 
to and regulating the business for which such permit is sought. 
(2) Persons applying for or obtaining permits under the 
provisions of this Section shall comply with the provisions 
of this Section." Subsection (f) provides for the revocation 
of permits: "Any permit issued under the provisions. of this 
Section may be revoked or suspended upon the grounds pro-
vided for in this Section: (1) ... If persons holding permits 
under the provisions of this Section shall violate any of the 
provisions of this Section or any provisions of any other ordi-
nance, or any law relating to or regulating any such busil1ess, 
01' shall CQnduct 01' carryon such business in an unlawful 
• i 
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manner, the Board. in addition to 'any other penalties pro-
vided by this Code. <;hall l'evob::.."uch permit iRsued to such 
person; (2) ... Permits granted pursuant to this Section 
shall be revoked only in the manner provided in Section 22.02 
of this Code; (3). . No permit shall be'~ranted to any per-
son to ('onduct. man~e, carryon or deal in any business 
mentioned in subsection 'a' of this Section whose permit has 
been revoked by the Board until six (6) months have elapsed 
after such revocation" HolderR of permits must keep a com-
plete record of all goods purchased or received by them, which 
is open to inspection by any member of the police department. 
They must also file with the Chief of Police daily reports on 
prescribed forms of the goods purchased or received during 
the preceding day, describing the article and specifying the 
hour of the day when it was acquired, the name and address 
of the party from whom it was acquired, the height, age, sex, 
complexion, and other characteristics of that person. The I 
hours of business are prescribed. Secondhand dealers must 
keep the articles received by them 21 days before selling them. 
The period prescribed for junk dealers is three days. With 
respect tG certain articles classed as scrap, junk dealers are 
exempted from the provisions requiring the keeping of rec-
ords, the filing of reports. and the keeping of articles for three 
days. There are comparable exemptions for secondhand 
dealers. If a claim is made that property in the hands of the 
holder of a permit is stolen, the board, in the event no court 
action is pending, may determine whether or not the property 
was stolen from the claimant and order its return if it was. 
If such an order is disobeyed. the board may revoke the per-
mit. The foregoing provisions are reasonable, and the stand-
ards prescribed are adequate. (In re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 
646 [203 P. 398] ; Oo-operative Junk 00. v. Board of Police 
Oommissioners, 38 Cal.App. 676. 679 [177 P. 308]; Zemanskll 
v. Board of Police Oommissioners, 61 Cal.App.2d 450, 453-455 
[143 P.2d 361]; see 30 A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R. 970, 972; 
7 Cal.Jur. 10-yr. Supp. 366; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355; 47 
Am.Jur. 555.) 
[2] Regulation of the business of junk dealers and second-
hand dealers is designed to protect the public interest by pre-
venting such dealers from becoming outlets for stolen goods. 
No question arises as to the constitutionality of such regula-
tion when the business regulated is not carried on by a re-
ligious organization. (Lewis v. Quinn, 217 Cal. 410, 413 [19 
) 
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P.2d 236]; In re Holmes, supra; Oo-operative Junk Co. v. 
Board of Police Oommissioners. supra; Zemansky v. Board of 
Police Commissioner's, supra; see 3{) A.L.R. 1427; 88 A.L.R. 
970, 972; 7 Cal.Jur. 10-yr. Supp.)66; 33 Am.Jur. 336-339, 355 : 
47 Am.Jur. 554.) Business carried on by a religious organiza· 
tion cannot be differentiated, for the reasons set forth below 
with respect to the validity of t.he relN,lation of plaintiff's 
solicitation of funds foreharity. '. 
[3] Sections 44.0}. to 44.19 of the Los Angeles Municipal 
Code regulate solicitations of funds for charity. The term 
"charitable" includes "Philanthropic, social service, benevo-
lent, patriotic, either actual 04 purported." The term "con-
tribution" includes "alms, fooa, clothing, money, property 
or donations under the guise of a loan of money or property." 
(§ 44.01.) Certain provisions, applicable to solicitors of 
charitable contributions in general, are designed primarily to 
secure information that will assist the public in judging the 
nature and worthiness of the cause for which the solicitation 
is made and to insure the presentation of such information. 
to prospective donors. We find nothing unduly burdensome 
or unreasonable in any of these provisions. Section 44.05, 
which is quoted in the margin,· requires any person who 
solicits for any charitable purpose to rue with the Department 
.''N 0 person shall solicit,. nor shall an1. officers or member of any 
association authorize any person to solhllt, any contribution for any 
charitable purpose unless, within the fiscal year of the City in which such 
solicitation is made and at least within ten (10) days prior to the be· 
ginning of such solicitation, there shall have been 1I1ed with the Depart-
ment, on a form furnished by said Department, by such person or asso-
ciation upon whose behalf the solicitation is made, written Notice of 
Intention to solicit I!1lch contribution, which notice shall contain complete 
information as follows: 
"(a) The purpose of the solicitation and UN of the contribution to 
be solicited j 
"(b) A specific statement, supported bl reasons and, if available, 
Agures, showing the need for the contribution proposed to be solicited; 
.. (c) The character of such solicitation and how it will be made or 
~nducted; 
"(d) The expenses of the solicitation, including salaries and other 
items, if any, regardless of from what funds such expenses are payable; 
.. (e) What portion of the contributions collected as a result of the 
IOlicitation will remain available for application to the speei1ic purposes 
declared in the Notice of Intention as the object of the IOlicitation; 
"(f) A specific statement of all contributions collected or received 
by l!1leh person or aasociation within the ealendar year immediately 
preceding the filing of such Notice of Intention. The expenditure or use 
made of I!1lch contributions, together with the names and addresses of 
all persons or associations receiving salaries, wages, eompeu.aat.i.cm, eoa-
) 
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of Social Service a noticE' of intention to solicit ten days before 
the solicitation. This notice must contain, among other things, 
information regarding the purpose, character, method, and 
estimated expenses of the solicitation, the need for the con-
tribution to be solicited, the proposed use of the solicited 
funds. the amount that will re'inain available for charitable 
purposes over expenses. thc ,mount received from solicitations 
in the preceding calendar year, the expenses of such solicita-
tions, and the amount that remained available for charitable 
purposes. The department may int8Stigate the statements 
in the notice of intention. (§ 44.03(a).) Information cards 
setting forth the facts in the notice of intention and such other 
facts as in the opinion of the Board of Social Service Com-
missioners will be of assistance to the public in determining 
the nature and worthiness of the solicitation (Section 44.06 
quoted in the rnargint) are issued by the Department of Social 
Service!: for four cents per card. (§ 44.03 (e).) The infor. 
missions or emoluments from such contributions, and the respective 
amounts thereof; 
"(g) The names and addresse~ of the officers and directors of any 
such association fOT which the solicitation is proposed to be made; 
"(h) A copy of the resolutlOn, if any, of any such association au-
thorizing such solicitation, certified to as a true and correct copy of the 
original of such resolution by the offi('.er of such association having : 
charge of the records thereof; 
"(i) A statement that the sib'1lerS of such Notice have read and are 
familiar with the provisions of this Article and will require all IOlicitors 
engaged in such solicitation to read and be familiar with all eections 
of this Article prior to making any such solicitation." 
t"There shall be filed with the Department with such Notice of in-
tention a statement of any agreement made with any agent, IOlicitor, 
promoter, manager or conductor of such solicitation, together with a 
copv of each agreement which may be in writing. Within twenty-four 
bours after any change in any such agreement or the making of any 
new or further agreement, a true copy of such change or agreement, 
if in writing, or if not, written details thereof shall be filed with the 
Department. Whenever, in the opinion of the Board, the Notice of in-
tention filed with the Department does not disclose sufficient information 
for the public concerning the facts hereinabove required to be stated in 
Buch Notice or concerning the person or association making such IOlicita-
tion or on whose behalf such solicitation is made, then, upon the request 
of said Department, there shall be filed, in writing, within forty-eight 
(48) hours after such request, such additional information as may be 
required by said Board upon the foregoing subjects. Provided, how-
ever, that the Board, for good cause, may extend the time for filing such 
additional information. The Notice of Intention and such additional 
information, if requested, shall be ~igned by such person intending to\ 
make such solicitation, or if by or on nny association, by at least two 




Nov. 1945) GOSPEL ARMY t'. Cl'l'Y OF Los A~GEL~ 23!l 
[27 C.2d 232; 163 P.2d 704] 
mation cards, which are in effeet permits to solicit, are issued 
automatically upon the filing of the required information and 
the payment of the four cents for each card. The department is 
given no authority to wit.hhold such cards when these require-
ments are met, and we cannot assume that it will abuse its 
authority in order to wit.hhold them. As this court said in 
Tn rc Holmes, 187 C~l. 640. 64''7 [203 P. 3981, quoting from 
In rc F'lahertu, 105 Cal. 55i; 562 [38 P. 981, 27 L.R.A. 5291 
and Gaylord v. Citll of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 43!=!, 437 Pfi6 P. 
3481: "'Laws are not made li~on the theory of the total de-
pravi1y of those who are ejected to 118.minister them; ana t.h<-
presumption is that municipal officers will not use these small 
powers villianously or for purposes of oppression or misehief.' 
If this petitioner had applied for a permit under the require-
ment of the section of the charter above quoted, and been 
either whimsically or arbitrarily refused such permit, he 
mi~ht then. as is shown in Gaylord v. Oity of Pasadena, S1(pra. 
have had recourse to the courts for relief from such unjust 
and arbitrary action." 
Each solicitor must exhibit an information card to the pro-
spectiye donor and must not make any misstatements. A so-
licitor must also carry written authorization from the assol?in-
tion that he represents. The board may recall the cardR awl 
amend them if it receives additional information showing that 
any statements thereon are incorrect. The board may not dis-
allow a proposed solicitation but it may investigate the 
statements in the notice of intention and the methods of mak-
ing or conducting the solicitation; it may inspect the records 
of the person in charge of the solicitation and the association 
for whom it is made, and it may give such publicity to its 
findings as it deems best to reach the general public and per-
sons interested. Th~ association for whom the solicitation is 
made must maintain an accounting system recording the entry 
of all donations and disbursements. (§ 44.08.) 
More restrictive provisions are applicable to promoters. A 
promoter is "any person who for pecuniary compensation or 
consideration received, or to be received, solicits or is engaged 
in the business of or holds himself out to the public as engaged 
in the business of soliciting contributions for or on behalf of 
any other person or any charitable association, corporation or 
institution, or conducts, manages or carries on ... any drive 
or campaign for any such purpose; provided, however, that 
) 
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pecuniary compensation or consideration as used herein, shall 
include, but shall not be limited to, participation on a per-
centage basis in any fund ;solicited, or raised, for or on behalf 
of any other person, firm, association or corporation; pro-
vided, further, that no person who is a bona fide paid officer 
or employee of a social service agency endorsed by the Board 
of Social Service Commjssioners, shall be considered a pro-
moter within the meaning of ~is article." (§ 44.01.) The 
conditions that a social agency must meet to be endorsed by 
the Social Service Commission an4, the standards that govern 
the commission are set forth in a separate ordinance, the rele-
vant part of which is quoted in the margin.· In our opinion 
·"Sec. 2. Said Commission shall have power: 
"I. To investigate, when requested or permitted, by the officers or 
persons in charge thereof all charitable or philanthropic corporations or 
associations dependent upon public appeal or general lIolicitations for 
support, and submit quarterly, in writing. the result of such investiga-
tion to the Council. 
"2. To endorse such of said charitable corporations or associations 
as shall apply to said Commission for endorsement and prove to the Com-
mission that they have complied with the following provisions, namely: 
"(a) That the title to any real property in the City of Los Angeles 
owned by such charitable corporation or association ill vested in the 
name of said charity, if it be a corporation, or ebe in the name or 
names of a responsible trustee, or trustees onder a declaration of trust 
or other written instrument, setting forth the rights of such charitable 
corporation or association therein, and recorded in th(' records of the 
County Recorder of Los Angeletl County. 
"(b) That the declared purpose for whiCh such a corporation or as-
sociation is organized are charitable or philanthropic, and not for the 
pecuniary profit of thp members or associates thereof or any of them. 
"(c) That for three months prior to its endorsement said charitable 
corporation or association has faithfully complied with the following 
provision~ with reference to its accounts, namely: All funds received 
by it and all disbursements made by it, have been entered upon the books 
of its treasurer or other financial officer, receipts have been given 01' 
tendered for all money or other property donated to it, whenever reo 
quired by law or ordinance all expenditures other than petty cash to a 
reasonable amount have been made by checks signed by at least two 
officers of such corporation or association; that the bank book of such 
asosciation or corporation has been balanced and reconciled with the 
books of account at reasonable intervals. 
"(d) That no moneys of lI3.id corporation or association are on Ioan 
directly or indirectly to any officer, director, trustee or employee thereof, 
and that the corporation or association for a period of three monthll 
prior to its enoorsement bas not invested any moneys constituting part 
of itll permanent endowment funds exeept in lIecurities legal as invest-
ments for savings banks within the State of California, and has not 
paid out more than 15% of any amounts collected by solicitation within 
the City of Los Angeles for expenses of 1I0licitation, and has not diverted 
funds donat.ed to it from any iOurce to purpOl!etl other than thotle for 
which they were donated. 
"'Prooric1ed, boWfter, that the proviaiou of Uda paragraplllball .. 
/ 
/ 
Nov. 1945] GOSPEL ARMY V. CITY OF Los ANGELES 241 
[27 C.2d 232; 163 P.2d 704) 
the classification effected bv this ordinance is reasonable and 
the standards provided ar~ adequate. 
A promoter must apply fOJ! a promoter's license. The ap-
plication must set forth )he applicant's qualifications and 
show that he is of good character and reputation. Persons 
working as solicitors for 'compensation under the promoter 
must be registered as soticitors. The ... board grants a promoter's 
license if it is satisfied that the applieant is of good character 
and reputation, is equal to the financial responsibility incident 
to the proposed solicitation and ~intends to conduct his busi-
ness as promoter fairly and honestly. Similarly, before reg-
istering a soliritor, the board must be satisfied of his good 
character and reputation. A license fee of $25 is required for 
a promoter's license. A promoter must also file a $2,000 bond 
with the board to insure contributors against loSR through 
theft. Solicitors must file a $!'>OO bond and pay a registration 
fee of $1.00. The board may revoke a promoter's license, after 
a hearing. for any "unfair. llnjust. inequitable or fraudu-
apply to anr loan or investment that hils been made prior to the passagE' 
of this ordmancE'. 
"(e) That the work for whlch su<!h corporation or 8.l!Sociation bas 
been organized bas been faithfully performed. 
"(f) That the by·laws and other written rules and regulations of 
such corporation or association define the powers and duties of the offi-
cers of such corporation or association, and that a copy of the ArticleI', 
of Incorporatiton of said charity, if it be a corporation, and a copy of 
the By·Laws and other written rules and regulations of such corporation 
or association have been filed With the Social Service Commission. 
"(g) That within three months prior to its endorsement such 8 
corporation 0'1' M~o~iRtkn hn!l not violated anv \a'l'\" or ordinance ap-
plicable to it. . 
"(b) Tbat the officers and employees of such corporation or associa-
tion are persons of good moral character and reputation and that the 
corporation or association has exerciRed reasonable care in selecting 
persons of goorl mOl'1t1 I'hnroptpT AT'iI PPRlIonnhlp E':q>eTienrp R~ "o1icitor~ 
for its funds. 
"Said Commission sllall ISSUp said endorsement to any such corpora· 
tion or association as shall comply with the aforesaid requirements. Said 
endorsement shall be valid for such time as shall be fixed by the Com-
mission but not exceeding one yeAr from date of its issuance. 
"Said Commil.sion shall report to the Couneil upon request by it the 
name of any corporation or association which is endorsed or has been 
refused endorsement by it. with R la'enerR I "tRtement of the reasons for 
its refusal. 
"Said Commission shall also have power to request any endorsed 
corporation or usociation to make application for a new endorsement 
at or after the end of each fiscal year or at an earlier period if the 
Commission shall deem such requirement advisable, and if _id corpora-
tion or 8.l!Sociation IIhall not 80 do its endorsemeDt Iha1I be withdrawn." 
/) 
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lent" act of a promoter or his employees, or agents in making 
a solicitation or conducting tll~ husiness of promoter. Any 
ground that would have led to' denial of the license is a11l0 
ground for its revocation. ., 
Solicitations upon premises owned or occupied by the asso-
ciation upon wIlOse hrIm If the 1Iolir.iSation is mnde, ani! the 
soliciting of funds solel~' Trom members of the soli('iting asso-
ciation arc not suhject to tlJ{' provisions concerning promoters 
and !ololicitors or to certain other' "eglllator~' provisions of the 
ordinance. "Solicitations made solely for eYan!!e1i('a 1 mi1l-
sionan' or religious purposes" are also exempted. If. however, 
they are conducted in such a manner as in the' opinion of the 
hoard may give the persons solicited or the publi(' the impres-
liion t11llt the purpose of the solicitation is in whole or in part 
charitable. the board may investigat.e the matter and give 
su('h publicity to it.s finding'!! liS it may deem hest to advisE' the 
pnhli(' of the facts. (~44.16.) 
[4J Plaintiff contends t.hat since the practice of charity 
IInr] the solicitation of funds for that purpose are part of its 
religions duties, the ordinances regulating the so1i('.itation of 
('haritll hIe contributions cannot apply to plaintiff's solicita-
tions without abridging its religious liberty in violation of 
the Constit.ution of t.he Unit.ed State1l lIud the Constitution of 
f'[11ifornia. 
ReliQ"iOl1s liberty "embraces two concepts,-freedom to be-
lirw nnd freedom to act. The first is absolutE' but. in the 
natm'C' f)f things. the second cannot be." (Cantwell v. Sfate of 
f:onnertiCllt. 310 U.S 296. 303 r60 S.Ct. 900. 84 TJ.Ed. 1213. 
12>< A.L.R. 13!121.) The eonstitutional guarantee protects the 
:lrl)fession of II religious belief by word of mouth or in writ-
ing. t1IP dissemination of the doctrines of a religious organi-
zation b~' preaching from the pulpits or other method~ of 
evan (.!p.Ji!lm, or the right to refuse to state beliefs against the 
riictate" of one'~ e.onsciene.e. (M1lrdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 
n.R ]05. 109 [63 S.Ot. 870. R9I. 87 L.Ed. 1292. 146 A.L.R. 
811: West Virginia v. Barnette. 319 U.s. 624. 642 [63 ~tCt. 
1178.87 L.Ei!. 1628.147 A.L.R. 6741.) "If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official. 
high or pet.ty. can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nat.ionalism. religion. or other matters of opinion. or force 
citizens to confess by word of mouth or act their faith there-
in." (West Virgini" v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624. 642 f63 S.Ot. 
1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674].) It does not follow, 
) 
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however, that religious organizations cnjoy unlimited frccdom 
in carrying on a]] activities refitted to their rcligious program. 
As the TTnitC'n States SnpN'lne Court d('(~lared in 'Murdor.k v. 
PcnnsJ/7va?1?·I1. 3HITTiS. 105, 109-110 r63 S.Ct. 870. 8!lJ. 87 
L.En. 1292. 14(1 .-}.L.R. R]l: "we do not intimate or suggest 
.. that an~' condllC't can he madE' ll~rrli~ioll~ rite Ilnd b~' the 
zeal of the practitioners swept into' t111' First Amendment. 
Reynolds v. TTnite.d Rta.tes.'.Q,8 U.R. 14!'i. 161-Hi7. 2!) L.Bi!. 244. 
and Da.vis '\". Beason. 133 n.S. 333. 10 S.Ot. 2!)!l. ~m L.Ri!. fl37. 
denied any such claim to the pr8eticE' of poh'l!am~' ana bigamy. 
Other claims may well arise whirh deser'Ve the same fate. We 
only hold that spreading one's religiOlls hrlief!': or prearhing 
the Gospel through distribution of rE'li'!ious litE'ratnre and 
through personal visitations is an a~e-old t~"Pe of evangelism 
with as high a claim to constitutional protE'rtion as the more 
orthodox types." 
Man;\' activities prompted by religious motives can hardly 
be diffE'rentiated from secular acth·ities. If the applicability 
of government reg'ulation turned on the religions motivation 
of activities. plausible motivations would multiply and in the 
end vitiate any regulation. "~iYil 1ihC'rtie.~. as guaranteE'd by 
the Constitution. imply the existenre of an organized society 
maintaining public orner without whir11 liherty it!Oelf would 
be lost in the excesses of unrestrained a buses .... Where II re-
striction of the use of hi!!hways ... il': nE'!';igned to promote 
the publi(' <.'onvenien('e in the interest of all. it cannot be dis-
regardeo h~- the IIttempteo exercise of !';ome civil ril:!ht which 
in other circumstances wouln be entitled to protection. One 
would not be .iustified in ignoring the familiar red traffic 
light because he thought it his religious dut;\' to disobey the 
m-uni('ipal commano or ~oul!ht h, that means to direct 'Ptlblic 
attention to an announcement of his opinions." (Cox v. New 
Hampshire. ::112 TTK !'if)9. !)74 r~l S.Ct. 762. 8!) L.Ed. 1049. 
J33 A.L.R 139f)1 , Tn Pri'nce v. ~[nssachuse.tts, 321 U.~. 158 
r64 8.et. 43fl. 8R L.Rn. fi451. it was contended that religious 
liberty was abridged bv the application of a statute regulating 
child labor to II ~lIl'oilln who permitted her minor ward to 
distribute religious liternture on the streets at night. Tn vin-
dicating t.he state's power to regulate in this way thE' dis.~emi· 
nation of religiou!': heliefs. the court declared: "The parent.'s 
conflict with the stllt.e ow'r control of the child and his train-
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It becomes the more so when an element of religious eonvic-
t.ion enters. Against these 811~rei! private interests, basic in a 
democ1'n<'? stani! th(' int('rest~ of 80ciet:' to protect the wel· 
fare of ('hildren and th(' state's ass(,1'tion of fluthority to that 
end. made here in a manner ~oncede<l valii! if only seeu1ar 
thin/'"s \\'er(' involved The last 'ls no mere ~orporate concern 
of officia 1 aut horit". ft is'the ltlterest of youth it.o;elf. and of 
t.he whole ('ommnl1·itv. that children be both safeguarded from 
ahuses and given ~pportunities for growing into free and 
independent well-developed men and ('ith~ens. Between con-
trary pulls of such weight. the' ~afest ani! most objective re-
course is to the lines nlrendy marked out. not precisely but 
for guides. in narrowing the no man's land where this battle 
has gone on the family itself is not be~'ond regulation in 
the pUblic interest. AS against a claim of religious liberty. 
Reynolds v. United S:f"te.~. 98 n.R 145. 2!'i T.J.Ei!. 244: Davis v. 
Beason. 133 U.S. 333. 10 S.Ct. 2!HI. 33 L.Ed. 637. And neith(!r 
right'! of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limi-
tntion. Acting to guard the general interests in youth's well 
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent'" 
control by requiring school attendance. regulating or pro-
hibiting the chiJd's labor and in many other ways. Its au-
thority is not nullified merely because the parent ~rounds his 
claim to control the child's eourse of conduct on religion or 
conscience .... It iR sufficient to show what indeed appellant 
hardl~' disputes. that the state has a wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authorit~· in thin~ affecting 
the child's welfare: and that this includes. to some extent, 
matters of conscienee ani! religious conviction." 
Activities characteristie of t.he secular life of the com-
munity may properly be a concern of the community even 
though they are carried on by a religious organization. (See 
Prince v. Massac71usetts. 321 n.s. ]58. 165 [64 S.Ct. 438. 88 
L.Ed. 645] : United States f'. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78. 87 [64 S.Ct. 
882, 88 L.Ed. 11481: Murdock v. Pennsylt.ania. 319 U.S. 105. 
109 [63 S.Ct. 870. 1391. 87 L.Ed. 1292. 146 A.L.R. 811 : rha.p-
linsky v. New Hampshire. 315 n.s. 568. 571 [62 S.Ot. 766. 86 
L.Ed. 10311: Cox v. 'New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569, 574 161 , 
S.Ct. 762. 85 L.Ed. 1049. 133 A.L.R. 13961: Dat.is v. Reason. . 
133 U.S. 333. 342 rIO S.Ct. 299. 33 L.Ed. 6371 : Tn re Dart. 
172 Cal. 47.56 [155 P. 63. Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127. L.R.A. 1916D 
905] : Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' etc .. 46 CaJ.App.2d 129, 
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243, 98 Am.St.Rep. 666, 63 L.R.A. 187] ; Oity of St. Louis v. 
H ellscher, 295 Mo. 293 [~42 S.W. 652]; Commonwealth v. 
('hilds, 299 ~iass. 367 [12 :-':.E.2d 814] ; Oommonwealth v. 
Ureen, 268 Mass. 585 [168 N.E. 101J ; Oommonwealth v. Plais-
ted, 148 Mass. 375 [19 N.E. 224, 12 }\m.St.Rep. 566, 2 L.R.A. 
142] ; State v. Wl}.ite, 64 N.H. 48 [5 A. 828]; Stull v. Reber, 
215 Pa. 156 [64 A. 419, 7 Ann.Cas. 415) ; Matter of Frazee, 
63 Mich. 396, 405 [30 N.W. 72, 6 Am.St.Rep. 3101; State v. 
Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 99 ... [71 N.E. 197]; see, also. 7.o11man, 
Religious Moerty in the American Law, 17 Mich.L.Rev. ::l55, 
456.) Religious organizations engage in various activities stl('h 
as founding colonies, operating libraries, schools, wineries, 
hospitals, farms. industrial and other commercial enterprises. 
Conceivably they may engage in virtually any worldly activ-
ity, but it does not follow that they may do so as specially 
privileged groups, free of the regulations that others must 
observe. If they were given such freedom, the direct conse-
quence of their activities would be a diminution of the state's 
power to protect the public health and safety and the gen-
eral welfare. With that power so easily diminished there 
would soon cease to be that separation of church and state 
underlying the constitutional concept of religious liberty. (See 
Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54 [222 P. 
801, 31 A.L.R. 1121] ; Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691 
[166 N.W. 202, 5 A.L.R. 841] ; People ex rel. Ring v. Board of 
Education, 245 TIL 334 [92 N.E. 251, 19 Ann.Cas. 220, 29 
L.R.A.N.S. 442]; Board of Education of Cincinnati v. 
Minor,23 Ohio St. 211 [13 Am.St.Rep. 233] ; Donn-hoe v. Rich-
ards, 38 Me. 379 [61 Am.Dec. 256].) 
There is no doubt that plaintiff, like many religious organi-
zations, regards the practice of charity as a religious duty. 
It is Dot exclusively a religious activity, however; many char-
itable activities spring from sources in the everyday life of the 
community unrelated to religion. The state itself has an 
active responsibility for the welfare of the poor, the aged, the 
sick, the unemployed, and thc orphaned. There is a public 
interest in regulating the solicitation of funds for these pur-
poses. The very worthiness of such purposes creates a risk 
that the charitable impulses of people may be taken advantage 
of by solicitors who would collect funds under false pretenses 
or retain for themselves an undue percentage of what they 
collected. Fraud in the solicitation of charitable contributions 
24(; ['27 U.2d 
can be most effectively eontl'ollerJ by I1leaSlll'eS such as the 
regulation in question rrquiring t.he prescntation of informa-
tion to ella blr the TlUhlir to determine the nature and worthi-
ness of the purpose for:whictl thE' solicitation is made, and 
requiring proof of the gooV ehRl'lH'ler and reputation of paid 
solieitors. In the words of :\1r .. Tu!';tiee Shaw, speaking for 
a majority of the court in In rc Dart, ]72 Cal. -1-7, 56 rt55 P. 
63, Ann.Cas. ln17D ]]27. L.R.A. ~16n n051: "The occupa-
tion of soliciting cont.rihutions to charitable purposes is clearly 
so far subjcct t.o the police power, that it may bE' regulated by 
laws or ordinances providing for a reasonable supervision over 
the persons engaged therein, and for the application and use 
of the contributions received to the purposes intended, in 
order to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money, 
or other things, under the pretense that they were to bc ap-
plied to charity, and to prevent the wrongful diversion of 
such funds to other uses, or to secure them against waste. 
Measures reasonabl~' tending to secure these ends are un-
questionably valid." (See ('ases ('ollectE'd in 57 A.TJ.R 516, 
128 A.L.R. 1361.) 
The religious organization in Cantwell v. ()onnecticut, 
supra, on which plaintiff relies, solicited funds, not for char-
itable purposes but for its own support. Under the statute 
there involved it was nllowed to engage ill such solicitation 
only if the licensing officer determined that its cause was a 
religious one and issued a certificate to that cffect. It was 
held that the vesting of this power in an administrath'e official 
amounted to "censorship of religion as the means of deter-
mining its right to survive" since under the statute the offi-
cial's judgment was decisive as to what constituted a reiig-
ious cause. The ordinance involved in the present case spe-
cifically exempts solicitations for religious purposes only; its 
object is to regulate alJ solicitations for charitable purposes. 
The Board of Social Service Commissioners has no authority 
to appraise the nature or wortfliness of a religious cause. In 
the Cantwell case the court recognized that even the solocita-
tion of funds for the support of a religious organization is 
subject to reasonable regulation: "The general regulation, in 
the public interest, of solicitation, which does not im'olve any 
religious test and does not unreasonabl~' obstruct or delay the 
collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objec-
tion, even though the collection be for a reJigious purpose. 
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restraint on the free exercise or religioll or interpose an in-
admissible obstacle to its exercise." (310 U.S. 296,305.) 
Thomas v. Oollins. 323 U.S. 516 165 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 
430], cited in support of piaintiff"s contentions, "does not 
involve the solicitation 'b:r'funds or property." (65 8.0t. 315. 
324.) The court thet'e held that a state ('ould not ('onstitu-
tionally require a paid union org,anizer to register with the 
Secretary of St.ate before making a, puhli(' speech inyiting a 
nonunion worker specifi('all~~ .... lind nonunion workers in the 
audience generally to join the union. "We think a require-
ment that one must register before he undertakes to make a 
public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite 
incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment." 
(65 S.Ot. 315, 327.) The court was careful, however, to dis-
tinguish cases ill which the speaker solicits funds from the 
public: "Once the speaker goes further, however. and engages 
in conduct whiel) amounts to more than the right of free 
discussion comprehends. as when he undertakes the collection 
of funds or securing subscriptions. he enters a realm where a 
reasonable registration or identification requirement may be 
imposed. In that context sueh !'!olicitation would be quite 
different from the solicitation involved here. It would be free 
speech plus conduct akin to the activities which were present, 
and which it was said the State might regulate. in Schneider 
v. Z,'vington, supra, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L.Ed. 155, 60 8.0t. 146. 
and Oantwell v. Oonnecticut, 310 U.S. 296. 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60 
8.0t. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1452. both supra. That however must be 
done and the restriction applied. in such manner as not to 
intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly. In 
this case the separation was not maintained." In his concur-
ring opinion in Thomas v. Collins Mr. Justice Jackson gives 
the following reasons for these variations in state power: 
"This wider range of power over pursuit of a calling than 
over speech-making is due to the different effects which the 
two have on interest.c; which the state is empowered to protect. 
The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to 
protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or 
another to obtain its money. When one does so through the 
practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shield-
ing the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or 
the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of 
agency. A usual method of performing this function is 
through a licensing system. 
) 
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"But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, 
of the state to protect the public against false doctrine. The 
very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose pubHe 
authority from assuming a gua rdianship of the publie mind 
through regulating the press, -speech, and religion. In thlI 
field every person mmlt be )lis own watchman for truth, be-
cause the forefathers did not trust any government to separate 
the true from the false for us. West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 31'9.., U.S. ,624, fi::J S.Ct. 1178, ff1 
L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674. Nor would 1. Very ma.uy are 
the interests which the state may protect against the praetiee 
of an occupation, very few are those it may assume to protect 
against the practice of propagandizing by speech or prell. 
These are thereby left great range of freedom." 
[5a] The requirement that promoters and the soliciton 
working under them submit proof of their good character 
and reputation doe~ not discriminate against plaintiff GIl' 
other religious organizations or censor their religious beliefs, 
nor does the regulation vest arbitrary power in the admin-
istrative board in authorizing it to withhold a license if it 
is not satisfied that the applicant is of good character and 
reputation. Such a requirement is common in statutes regu-
lating admission to professions and occupations involving 
duties of a fiduciary character. (In re Stepsay, 15 Ca1.2d 
71 [98 P.2d 489] ; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183 [294 
P. 697, 72 A.L.R. 9231; Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal.App. 83 
[238 P. 160] ; R~1ey v. Ohambers, 181 Cal. 589, 593 [185 P. 855, 
8 A.L.R. 4181 ; Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331 [90 P. 702] ; 
Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167 [77 P. 879, 1 Ann. Cas. 13] ; 
Gundling v. Ohicago, 177 U.S. 183, 187 [20 S.Ot. 633, 44 
L.Ed. 725]; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 [47 S.Ot. 
122,71 L.Ed. 331] ; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van. De 
Oarr, 199 U.S. 552 [26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305] ; Douglas v. 
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 [43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590] ; see, also, 12 
A.L.R. 1435, 1450; 54 A.L.R. 1104, 1112: 92 A.L.R. 400, 415; 
Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, pp. 466-482.) The filing 
of a bond is also a common requirement in the regulation 
of occupations or activities involving the handliug of en-
trusted funds. (Palmer v. Oontinen.tal Oasualty 00., 205 
Cal. 34, 35 [269 P. 638] ; Olark v. Patterson, 213 Cal. 4 [300 
P. 967, 75 A.L.R. 1124] ; Gundling v. Ohicago, supra; People 
of the State of 'Kew Yor7, v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 305 [171 N.E. 
72, 84 A.L.R. 636]; see 33 Am.Jur., Licenses, sec. 54; 87 
) 
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A.L.R. 145; 95 A.L.R. 1224; H)3 A.L.R. 405; 120 A.L.R. 
!l50.) [6] The license fee ~ a reasonable one, covering the 
('xpenses of investigations and administration. 
[5b] The board has no discretion to withhold a license 
if t.he applicant's good character all.~ reputation and his 
financial responsibility are established and the required bond 
is filed. The board is not free to deny licenses, but must act 
reasonably in the light of tbe evidence presented. (R~1ey v. 
('hambers, 181 Ca1. 589, 595 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418]; 
Tn re Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 647 [203 P. 398]; Tarpey v. 
McOlure, 190 Cal. 593, 600 [213 P. 983J ; Bank of Italy v. 
Johnson,200 Cal. 1, 32 [251 P. 784]; People v. Globe Grain 
and Mill. 00., 211 Cal. 121, 125 [294 P. 31; Oranford v. JOI'-
dan, 7 Cal.2d 465, 467 [61 P.2d 45]; Leach v. Daugherty, 
73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160] ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones 00., 242 
U.S. 539, 554 [37 S.Ct. 217, 61 L.Ed. 480]; Graves v. Min-
nesota, supra, p. 428; Douglas v. Noble, supra, p. 170; New 
York ex reI. Lieberman v. Van De Oarr, supra; Plymouth 
Ooal 00. v. Oommonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 
545 [34 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed. 713]; Minnesota v. Probate 
Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 [60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744. 126 
A.L.R. 530] ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 434. 4R!i 
[64 S.Ot. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834J.) 
The provision empowering the board to re\'okc a license 
in case of unfair, unjust, inequitable or fraudlent practices 
of solicitation is neither vague nor Wlcertain and affords no 
possibility for the censorship of religious beliefs. In Agnew 
v. Daugherty, 189 Cal. 446, 448-449 [209 P. 34], this court 
upheld a similar provision in the Corporate Securities Act 
making the granting of a permit dependent on the commis-
sioner's finding that the "proposed plan of business . . . is 
not unfair, unjust or inequitable" and that the methods to 
be used to dispose of eecurities "are not such as, in his 
opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof." (See, 
also, People v. Kuder, 93 Cal.App. 42 r269 P. 198, 6301; 
People v. Stewart, 115 Cal.App. 681, 689 [2 P.2d 195]; 
Yakus v. United States, supra, pp. 426-427. and cases there 
cited.) 
It is contended that since the trial court fOWld that plain-
tiff is engaged exclusively in religious activities, the Charities 
and Relief Ordinance is rendered inapplicable to plaintiff's 
solicitations because of its provision that it "shall not be ap-
plicable to solicitations made solely for evangelical, missionary 
Ii 
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or religious purposes." There is no conflict in the evidence, 
however, as to what plaintiff's activities are. The issue pre-
sented is one of law, namely, whether the charitable purposes 
for which plaintiff solicits funds are exclusively religious 
purposes within t~e meaning of the ordinance. The' trial ~ourt 
erroneously cOlJcluded that becauRI' plaintiff solicit.'l funds 
for charitable ~urpo~es as part of it.s religioUR program its 
solicitations are solely for religious purposes wit.hin the mean-
ing of the ordinance. The ordinan('e specificall~' differentiates 
charitabll' from religious pur{>oses. No person may solicit 
"any contribution for any charitable pUl'pose" without com-
plying with the requirements of the ordinance. The ordinance 
does not exempt solicitations for charitable purposes under-
taken by religious orga.nizations. Solicitations for charitable 
purposes, namely, for "philanthropic, !locial service. benevo-
lent, patriotic" purposes, are subje('t to regulation whether 
or not they are undertaken by a religious organization. The 
intention to maintain a sharp differentiation between chari-
table and religious purposes is apparent in the provision that 
if a solicitation for religious purposes is likely to give the 
public the impression that funds are sought for charity. the 
board shall "investigate the matter of such solicitation and 
give publicity to its findings thereon in such manner as it 
rna;\' deem best to advise the public of the facts of the case." 
The solicitation of funds to provide food, shelter. and clothing 
for those in distress is clearly for It charitable nurpose and 
is therefore regulated by the ordinance. Plaintiff admittedly 
'lolicits funds for the purpose of giving relief to persons in 
distrl'ss. Since this purpose is charitable within the meaning 
of the ordinance, plaintiffs' solicitations for that purpose are 
subject to the ordinance. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J. t Shenk, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-J dissent. The majority opinion places the 
stamp of validity in toto upon a regulatory ordinance con-
taining requirements so stringent that with their enforce-
ment humble charities and good works must inevitably 
bow to 
"The organized charity scrimped and iced 
"In the name of a cautious statistical Christ." 
Admittedly the intrusion into community existence of re-
! 
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ligioms activities characteristic of the secular life brings into 
sharp focus the conflicting loyalties to church and state, 
t.he clash of religious freedom with, social legislation. (See 
Conscience v. The State, by Prog. C. C. McCown, 32 Cal.L. 
Rev. 1; Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, by John 
Raeburn Green. 43 1\fich.Tj.Rev. 437: Rill of Rights Review 
of Am. Bar Ass'n .. vol. 1, .flo. 2.) , .. 
Since 1940 the subject nas been brought '-frequently before 
the United States Supreme Court by thc sect known as 
Jehovah's Witnesses, and that court. has heen alert to protect 
the free exercise of religion against abridgement. Its recent 
decisions, rendered at a time when the currents of world 
thought have been against democracy and toleration, have, 
as Professor McCown comments, made a substantial con· 
tribution to the defense of the liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution, and the emphasis in several of the opinions 
upon the rights of "little people," of causes that are humble, 
needy, and with financial resources. is particularly notable. 
Quoting from the cit.ed article. "The just.ices of the Supreme 
Court. echo the language of social and religious protest. from 
almost the beginning of history (2500 RC.) in Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, and later in Palestine, down to the present day. 
Such language is familiar in the Hebrew prophets, the Psalms, 
and the Gospels. The obligation of government to protect 
the rights of the weak against those- who possess political 
and economic power has been repeatedly proclaimed by 
prophets. but all too seldom recognized by the powers t.hat 
be. Both democracy and religion -demand the protection of 
the advocate of unpopular causes. for practically every reo 
form, whether political. social. or religious. begins as a protest 
against vested interest.-; and majority opinions .... In deal· 
ing with Jehovah's Witnesses the Supreme Court has shown 
a sanity and a considerat.ion for the ultimate issues involved 
which cannot but have some effect upon the cowardice of polio 
ticians and the impatience of crowds." (32 Ca1.L.Rev., pp. 
14, 30.) (See. also, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
r60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352]: Largent v. 
Tezas, 318 U.S. 418 r63 S.Ct. 667. 87 L.Ed. 873] ; Jamison v. 
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 [63 S.Ct. 669. 87 L.Ed. 869]; Murdock 
v. Pennsyl1Jania, 319 U.S. 105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 
1292, 146 A.L.R. 81]; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 [63 
S.Ct. 862, 882, 87 L.Ed. J3131: West Virginia v. Barnette, 
319 U.s. 624 [63 S.Ot. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674].), 
/ 
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In these decisions state legislation impinging upon a claimed 
reJigious freedom has been held valid only where there has 
been a strong showing of an essential need for regulation 
in the interest of the rmblie safety. health, and welfare, or 
for the maintenan~ of morals, peace, and order, prote<'tion 
against a clear and present danger, or the like. 
During the world war, as also pointed out by Professor 
McCown, the rise ot nationaJ.ism to the status of a religions 
cult and the contemporary sharpening of the Christian con-
science revitalized and reali~ed issues that were supposedly 
settled. Social problems have'.arisen which are ancient. but 
also very modern, and they are made the more difficult 
of solution by the traditions and social. political, religious, 
and legal philosophies with which they are surrounded. This 
country. having just emerged from a great conflict in which 
a guarantee of religious liberty to all peoples was a major 
aim, should be OIl guard against the subtle undennining, 
in the guise of municipal regulation. of those very right.~ 
which it has gone to such lengths to secure for others. For 
this reason the majority holding in the present case. .with 
its reactionary trend. is particularly deplorable. 
Obviously thE' commission of crime in the name of religion 
cannot be tolerated and the state must be safeguarded. The 
public are entitled to reasonable protection in community 
life, and fanaticism or misguided earnestness cannot be al-
lowed to hold rein over the goodwill of the people. But beyond 
situations of emergency and present danger. the field of regu-
lation should be extremely narrow. Thus in Schneider v. 
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147. 16] f60 S.Ct. 146. 84 L.Ed. 1551, 
the United States Supreme Court. after stressing the impor-
tance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of the con-
stitutional liberties, said: "In every case, therefore. where 
legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts 
should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legis-
lation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting mat-
ters of public convenience may well support regulation di-
rected at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify 
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the main-
tenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, 
the delicate and difficult. task falls upon the courts to weigh 
the circumstances and to appraisf' the substantiality of the 
reason advanced in '1Upport of the regulation of the free 
eujoyment of the rights." 
) 
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Using this formula to test the legisl~tion here under review, 
it appears that one of the main I"€asons advanced in support 
of the regulation is its asserted necessity to protect the publie 
from fraud. Resort to the penal statutes and usual methoc1~ 
of dealing with this evil k'said to afford'1!)sufficient protec· 
tion, in that warmhearted and generous ('itizens are especially 
vulnerable to solicitations made in the name of a religion or 
charity because of the nature of the appeal and their re-
luctance to turn a deaf ear to any .. cry of the poor and needy. 
Thu..<; a delicate social problem is ·posed. Which is the more 
important, to give the public added protection. over that 
of the penal statutes. against annoyance. inconvenience, and 
possible fraud, or to preserve i.ntact the cherished right of 
religious liberty T Should the state essay. at the expense of 
invasion of a constitutional ri.ght, to protect a citizen from 
his own inclination, or perchance his weaknes.<;, in responding 
to charitable solicitation without due inquiry into the worth 
of the sponsored cause' Is it not more in keeping with the 
American tradition to instill in youth and preserve in the 
thought of the people that individual independence, Rtrength 
of character, moral stamina. and perception which will enable 
them to judge personally the good or bad faith of a colporteur 
or solicitor and the merit of the cause he espouses' 
That some fraud may escape detection is to be anticipated. 
This is more or less true in all walks of life despite volume.<; 
of protective legislation. But the diversion to wrongful chan-
nels of some part of the public contribution to charity is 
not a major catastrophe when weighed against the cost of 
protection effected only by carving a large slice from the 
bill of rights. Indeed it may be asked whether any com-
munity can afford to undertake a regulatory program which 
may largely deprive the public of the opportunity to hear 
and respond to pleas of other than organized and municipally 
approved charities, thus !lti1ling the growth and character 
development gained by the exercise of pity. compassion, and 
generosity. Small are the sums contributed by the average 
community to charity when compared with the large amount.q 
customarily spent for luxuries and entertainment. In one 
sense the benefit of the opportunity to give where the right 
hand knows not what the left hand is doing is of more 
intrinsic value than the actual raising of the money, for all 
are in need of the spiritual enrichment which come.q of free 
will offering. There are few housewives who will not cheer-
) 254 GOSPEL AIl.\lY 1'. CJT\' OF Los ANGELES [27 C.2d 
fully give from t.llei1' larder to tell itinerant mendicants 
rather than run the risk of turning- awa~' hungry one man 
wort.h~' of alms. And by the sp.me reasoning there is less 
danger from solicitation for unworthy canses than from regu-
lations so string-ent that they ~ ma~' C)'ush the humble workers, 
the "little people." destro~' th~il' good deedR, impinge upon 
their practice of religion. ~nd form a breeding grounos for 
intolerance. totalitarianism. or narrow"nationaliRm. 
An of this has been given reC'ognition in the decisions of 
the United StateR Supreme Conrt. ~ the Cantwell ease it is 
said at pages 30R ann 310 "But the people of this nati01l 
have ordained in the light of history. that. in spite of the 
probability of excesses and ahuses. these liberties are. in 
the long view e.~seJJtial t.o enlightened opinion and right 
conduct on the part of the cit17:enR of II democracy. The e.~­
sential characteristiC' of these liherties is. that under t.heir 
shield many types of life. characteI'. opinion and belief ean 
develop unmoleRted and unohstrncted. Nowhere is this shield 
more necessary than ;n onr own countr~' for a people com-
posed of many raees and of man~' creedR. There are limits 
to the exercise of theRe liberties. The danger in these times 
from the coercive acth·it.ies of those who in the delusion 
of racial or religious conceit wonld incite \·i01enee ann 
breaches of the peace in order to denrive otheMl of their 
equal right to t.he exercise of th~ir liherties. is emphasized 
by event.s familiar to all. The.~e and other transgressions of 
those limits the states approprilltely may puniRh. . . . 
Equally Ob1,ious ;$ it that (/. state may not unnuly snppress 
free comm1(.nic.ation of dews. re7i('fiou.~ or f)ther. under the 
guise of conservin('f ncsi1"a'hle cO?lditioll.~. Here we have a 
situation analo~ous to a COl1viC'tion under a statute sweep-
ing in a great variet.y of conduct under a generlll ann 
indefinite characterization. and 1ea~ing to the executive and 
judicial branches too wioe Ii disl'rction in its application." 
(Italics ours.) 
Again it is said in the Schneider case at page 164: "Con-
ceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name 
of charity and religion, we hold a municipality cannot, for 
this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to 
present them first to police authorities for their eonsideration 
and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some 
ideas may. while others may not, he earried to the homes of 
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information from house to house. Frauds may be denounced 
as offense~ and punished by law. -: Trespasses may similarly 
be forbidden. If it is said that· these means are less effcient 
and cOllvenient than bestowal tf power on police authorities 
to deeide what illformatio:p may be disseminated from house 
to house. and who may impart the inf()rmation, the answer 
is that considerations 6f this sort do not":-empower a munici-
pality to abridge freedom of speech and press." The same 
is true with respect to abridglPent of the right of religious 
freedom. Many recent prolloune~ments of similar tenor might 
be added to· those above cited. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed review of the legis-
lation here involved, it may be stated that plaintiff is an 
incorporated religious organization and that it operates a 
mission and store. the latter being called its industrial de-
partment. Among its reli~ious activities are the holding of 
religious services at its mission by a minister ordained by it, 
church services and missionary work. giving away the New 
Testament and religious tracts. It conducts its operations in 
substantially the follov.1ng manner: Financial solicitors, work-
ing from its headquarters, endeavor to obtain money con-
tributions. These contribution.~ are delivered to the treasurer 
of the organization and are used for carrying on its religious 
activities. The present treasurer has been a solicitor for 
plaintiff for many years and retains 30 per cent of the 
funds collected. About 50 per cent of the funds are used 
for salaries and expenses. The minister's sole compensation 
is derived from contributions and it is said to cover no 
more than his expenses. Plaintiff also gives assistance in 
property and money to those in need. In operating its 
store or industrial department it acquires secondhand prop-
erty, most of which is called salvage, and sold to the public. 
The remainder is disposed of as junk. The truck drivers 
who collect the property receive a percentage of the sal-
vage, but they do not participate in the proceeds derived 
from operation of the store. They also retain all but 10 
per cent of the proceeds of the sale of the junk. Solicitors 
of salvage work from trucks and receive an average of 50 
cents an hour. The store uses its funds for expenses of 
operation and occasionally does charity work. The balance 
is delivered to plaintiff's treasurer. None of the salvage so-
licitors distribute plaintiff's religious literature. 
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its store, is a "promoter" a1; defined in the city ordinance, 
and demands that it obtain a license anthorizing solicitations 
for the store. No demand is made in regard to religious activi· 
ties, but a religious orga~ization is required to file a notice 
of intention and obtain a permit to solicit funds for chari-
table purposes. Apparently defendant department determines ' 
whether an organization ·~is soliciting for charity or for 
religion and has adopted a l'Ule that 50 per cent of the 
amount collected must go for.. charitable purposes. 
The trial court found on substantial evidence that plain-
tiff is a "duly constituted and functioning religious organi-
zation, engaged exclusively in the promulgation, by literature 
and word of mouth, of its religious beliefs, by and through 
its auxiliaries, and in the procuring of donations in the form 
of money and articles of value in the prosecution and further-
ance of its religious activities," and that if plaintiff is re-
quired to obtain a permit and pay a license fee as a condition 
of solicitation and receipt of donations "to be used in the 
furtherance of said religiou." activities," this "will amount 
to a prior restraint on the exercise of [its] religious activities 
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States 
. . • an infringement upon the free exercise of . . . religious 
liberty as protected by the Constitution." 
These findings require a consideration first of the question 
whether plaintiff's operations come in whole or in part within 
. the exemption provision of the ordinance. Solicitations upon 
premises owned or occupied by the association in whose be-
half the solicitation is made, and the soliciting of funds from 
members of the association are not subject to the promoter, 
solicitor, and certain other regulatory provisions of the or-
dinance. Exemption is also extended to "solicitations made 
30ZeZy for evangelical, missionary or religious purposes," but 
with the proviso that if such solicitations are conducted in a 
manner which, in the opinion of the board, may give those 
solicited the impression that the purpose of the solicitation I 
is in whole or in part charitable, the board may investigate 
the matter and give such publicity to its findings as it deems 
best to advise the public of the facts. 
In considering the applicability of the exemption to plain-
tiff's activities it would at first blush appear, and the trial 
court concluded, that inasmuch as all of plaintiff's operations, 
including its charitable work, are conducted for and as part 
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come within the exemption. However, a review of the or-
dinance in its entirety indicates that by use of the word 
"solely" in the exemption clluse, it was intended to dif-
ferentiate between solicitations for promulgation and sup-
port of the religion or church itself,. and solicitations for 
charitable work performed as part of t'he religious purpose, 
with exemption accorded to the former but not to the latter. 
If the exemption is thus unayuilable where the religious or-
ganization solicits fOl'charity in connection with the promul-
gation and exercise of its d~~rine." of religion (and this 
seems to be the interpretation placed upon the ordinance by 
the rulel': and regulations of the board and by the officers in 
enforcing it), then the \Talidity of the regulatory provisions 
must be tested by the limitations, if any, which may be im-
posed upon the exercise of the right of religious liberty. 
To a degree the majority opinion recognizes this fact but 
it implies, without straightway so declaring, that charitable 
undertakings are separable from the religious purpose in-
ducing them, and that by severance they may be removed 
to the realm of secular affairs and there by subjected. to 
governmental regulation without intrusion of the bothersome 
problem of preservation of the constitutional right of reli· 
gious liberty. This implication is inherent in the discussion 
which starts with the declaration (p. 12): "Many activities 
prompted by religious motives can hardly be differentiated 
for secular activities. If the applicability of government 
regulation turned on the religious moth ration of activities, 
plausible motivations would multiply and in the end vitiate 
any regulation," and proceeds to state (pp. 14·15): "Ac-
tivities characteristic of the secular life of the community 
may properly be a concern of the community even though 
they are carried on by a religious organization. . . . Religious 
organizations engage in various activities BUch as found-
ing colonies, operating libraries, schools, wineries, hospitals, 
farms, industrial and other commercial enterprises. Conceiv-
ably they may engage in virtually any worldly activity, but 
it does not follow that they may do so as specially privileged 
groups, free of the regulations that others must observe ..•. 
There is no doubt that plaintiff, like many religious organiza-
tions, regards the practice of charity as a religious duty. 
It is not exclusively a religious activity, however; many 
charitable activities spring from sources in ~e everyday 
'1 c.2d-t 
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life of the community unrelated to religion. The state itself 
has an active responsibility for the ,Ylclfare of the poor, the 
aged, the sick, the unemployed, and the orphaned. There is 
a public interest in regulating- the solicitation of funds for 
these purposes ... ." .. 
In the above discU:~sion thc majority opinioll quotes copi-
ously from Prine, v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [64 S.Ct. 
438, 88 L.Ed. 645], a case which has becn criticized as being 
out of line with other recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions. (See Liberty U"..de?· the Fourteenth Amendment, 
supra, at p. 446.) 
It is true that religious liberty "embraces two concepts 
-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute 
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be" (Cantwell 
v. Oonnecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 303), and that where 
the religious organization conducts activities characteristic 
of the secular life of the community, they may be subject 
to proper regulation under the police power. But, as already 
pointed out, this power of regulation. is not unrestricted and 
it can only be enforced with due regard to preservation of 
constitutional rights. Both freedom of religious thought and 
freedom of religious action come within the protection of 
the bill of rights. This freedom cannot be whittled away by 
carving out segments of religious activities and relegating 
them to the realm of secular affairs. If that were per-
mitted, the right of action for a religious purpose could 
eventually be destroyed by the gradual severance and clas-
sification as secular of every activity undertaken to promote 
the religious purpose. 
Aside from the pronouncements found in the late federal 
decisions, it has long been the law of this state that a charity 
conducted as part of a religious practice is inseparable from 
the religion itself. The utter impossibility of any severance 
is made plain in the case of Application of Dart (1916), 172 
Cal. 47 [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A. 1916D 
905], where in speaking of the Jewish and Christian religions 
it is said (pp. 55-56): "In both of these religions charity 
is the central word. It is enjoined, not as a good thing, or 
a wise thing, or as a kindly thing only, but as a fundamental 
part of the religion itself. Says the Jewish faith: 'On three 
things the world is stayed; on the Torah (the law) and on 
worship and on the bestowal of kindness.' 'Now the end of 
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to Timothy. 'Charity is the -:scope of all God's commands,' 
preaches Chrysostom. 'All perfection of the Christian life 
is to be attained according to charity,' declares Thomas 
Aquinas. Does it need more, does it need so much, to show 
that in these religions the bestow(ll of clut/'ity, the devotion 
of life to charity, are a part of the "'religion itself? And docs 
it demand discussion to establish so plain a truth as that 
touching religwn there is a doubtful zone which legislation 
Rhould be most reluctant to enterT The founders of the na-
tion recognized it when they placed the great guaranty' of 
religious liberty in t.he.., constitution of a free people, and 
it is for every court to see that that liberty is not encroached 
upon and that freedom gnawed and impaired by any ex-
perimental legislation however well meant. So when legisla-
tion doeR enter that uncertain domain, the fact that it is 
there must bring it to condemnation. In accordance with 
the dictate of the Constitution itself the doubt will be re-
solved in favor of religious liberty. And it will be found 
better in the long run that the free exercise of religion be 
preserved in its integrity, better for the nation, better for 
charity itself which owes 80 much to religion, even if th(> 
efficiency of religious charities be not up to the standard 
of perfection set by the Municipal Charities Commission. 
If, under that standard, seventy-five cents of every dollar 
would go to the objects of charity, while under the less 
efficient methods in vogue but fifty cents of each dollar actu-
ally reaches the beneficiaries, it is not to be forgotten that 
. there will be many millions fewer of these dollars to be 
distributed in charity if the activities of the religious are 
hampered, thwarted and stayed." (Italics ours. ) 
The above comment is extremely apropos. If, under de-
fendants' interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance, 
plaintiff is to be denied the benefit of the exemption clause 
in so far as its charitable activities are concerned, then the 
regulatory provisions of the ordinance must be subjected to 
close scrutiny in order to determine whether they infringe 
the guarantee of religious liberty. Although concededly acts 
of charity. apart from religious motivation, might be per-
formed by the state, or by a professed atheist or nonrcligionist. 
nevertheless the evidence here establishes beyond contradic-
tion that plaintiff's charities are an integral part of and 
inseparable from its religious purpose. From common knowl-
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OplnIOn, it must be said that acts of charity which do not 
stem, consciously or unconsciously, from early religious train-
ing or Christian inheritance are sparse .... · It is a matter of 
common historical knowledge that public charities and be-
nevolent associations for the gratuitous relief of every species 
of distress, are ptculiar to christianity; no otheJ: system of , 
civil or religious policy has originated them; they- form its 
highest praise and characteristic feature. The Apostle Paul 
in chapter XIII of his . first Epistle to the Corinthians 
epitomized his concept of the essential intangibles of Chris-
tianity and concluded with the immortal vel'Be: .. And now 
abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of 
these is charity." Thus charity is the heart and basic prin-
ciple of plaintiff's religion. To destroy that heart leave''! the 
body lifeless. Yet the majority opinion does just that. It 
declares charity to be a secular affair in spite of the above 
showing to the contrary and thus subjects the exercise by 
plaintiff of its religion to unrestricted regulation and ulti-
mate destruction. 
Moreover, the anomalous result of the majority opinion 
is that a religious organization may use its own funds for 
a charitable purpose without hindrance, but if it solicits di-
rectly for the charity, the solicitation is subject to the cum-
bel'Bome ordinance provisions hereinafter discussed. This 
makes the matter merely one of the form of the solicitation_ 
To avoid regulation and gain the protection of the exemption. 
the solicitor only needs to make his plea for funds in the 
name of his church. The church then receives the donations 
and use.e; them for any purpose it may choose, good or bad. 
charitable or uncharitable, and it is not reached b~' the 
ordinance provisions. 
Proceeding now to test the regulatory provisions of the 
ordinance as against the claimed infringement of the con- i 
stitutional guarantee of religious liberty, it will be noted 
that the majority opinion incorporates the provision!' by 
marginal reference and then, upon a discussion replete with 
generalizations, none of which standing alone can be said 
to contain an incorrect statement of the law, it announces 
the broad conclusion that, "We find nothing unduly burden-
some or unreasonable in any of these provisions" (p. 237); 
"In our opinion the classification effected by this ordinance 
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Were each regulation diseussed hi detail and given separat.e 
eonsideration, it is doubtful that even the author of the 
opinion would say that none is unduly 6nerous. Section 44.05 
imposes upon any person who wishes to 80lieit "any con-
tribution for any dlaritable purpose," a duty of filing with 
the department at least ten days prior to the commence-
ment of the work. a written notiee of inteRtion containing 
"complete infonnation" upQn eleven eomprEihensive phases 
of the undertaking. But a glance at this section shows that 
the much maligned income tax formR issued by the federal 
government are no more eomplex and demanding than is this 
notice of intention in its requirements of itemized data. One 
wonders where the average almsman or solicitor is to acquire 
the educational baekground to enable him to supply such 
statistics. Must the opportunity for exercising one's religion 
by doing eharitable work be limited to those who are apt 
in reading, writing, and arithmetic T 
The solicitor must show (a) "The purpose of the solieita-
tion and use of the eontribution to be solicited"; he must 
make (b) "A specific statement, supported by reasons and, 
if available, figures, showing the need, for the contribution 
proposed to be solieited"; he must show (c) "The character 
of such solicitation and how it will be made or conducted." 
How can these requirements be fitted into the program of 
the itinerant religionist who solicits as he wanders. taking 
with the one hand to give freely with the other, reserving 
for himself only bare necesRities' What freedom is left for 
the missionary and walking preacher who play so colorful 
a part on thE' American scene, soliciting their charities, 
spreading their doctrines, without preconceived plan and 
as each feels himself daily to be guided, and without com-
piling statistic.q or publishing abroad the good works. 
Further requirements of the notice indicate that its enforce-
ment will doubtless effect the disappearanee of all but or-
ganized institutions. for the applicant must also show the 
following; "( d) The expenses of the solieitation, including 
salaries and other items, if any, regardle..~ of from what funds 
such expenses are payable; (e) What portion of the contri. 
butions collected as a result of the solicitation will remain 
available for application to the specific purposes declared in 
the Notice of Intention as the object of the solicitation: (f) 
A specific statement of all contributions collected or reo 
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year immediately preceding thc filing of such Notice of In-
tention. The expenditure or use made of such contriblltions, 
together with the names and addresses of an persons or as-
sociations receivipg salaries, wages, compensation, commis-
sions or emolument.~ from such contributions, and the re-
spective amounts thereof'; (g) The names and addresses of the 
officers and directors' of any such assoeiation for whieh the 
solicitation is proposed to be made; (h) A copy of the resolu-
tion, if any, of any such association authorizing such solicita-
tion, certified to as a true anE] correct copy of the original 
of such resolution by the officer of such association having 
charge of the records thereof; (i) A statement that the signers 
of such Notice have read and are familiar with the provisions 
of this Article and win require all solicitors engaged in such 
solicitation to read and he familiar with aB sections of this 
Article prior to making any such Rolicitation." This last 
quoted provision expressly bars aB who have not attained 
a sufficient degree of learning to abide by its terms. 
As a whole the involved demands are a far cry from the 
simple regulation endorsed in the Cantwell case, to wit: 
that "Without doubt a state may protect its citizens from 
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the com-
munity, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for 
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to 
act for the cause which he purport'! to represent. The state 
is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicita-
tion generally. in the interest of public safety, peace. com-
fort or convenience." (810 U.S. at p. 806.) A regulation 
such as that described is not unreasonable and affords a suf-
ficient basis for the opening of an investigation in the event 
charges of fraud should be lodged against a solicitor. (Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 r68 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 
L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81].) Probably no sincere solicitor 
would protest having to register, carry an identification card. 
and conduct his activities in a seemly manner and at reason-
able hours. But he should be immune from any more onerous 
legislative interference, even though to some, his efforts might 
appear to be misguided. 
The ordinance contains further requirements even more 
burdensome than those above set forth. With the notice of 
intention there must be filed a statement of any agreement 
between solicitors and the organization for which they are 
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of Socia1 Service Commissionem the notice of intention ooeH 
not contain sufficient infortpation for the public concerning 
the fact.<; required to be therein stated, there must be filed 
within 48 hours such additional information as the board 
requests. (§ 44.06.) Th~ department J1as power to investigate 
the statements in the notice of intention and the method!; 
and manner of solicitation. to inspect record!'! of the associa-
tion for which the solicitation is made. and to issue to solicito~ 
information cards at four c'et:lt!'! a card. These information 
cards are in effect permit!; to solicit and thf'Y must set forth the 
facts stated in the notice of intention and such additional 
information as in the opinion of the board wilJ be of assistance 
to the public in determinin~ the nature and worthiness of 
the purpose for which the solicitation is made. (§ 44.03.) 
The board may reca]] information card!'! when the~' receive 
additional information which rende~ incorrect any state-
ment thereon and amend them. (§ 44.02.) No person shall 
emp10y any misstatement. deception. or fraud in connection 
with the solicitation (§ 44.04), or use a fictitious name 
(§ 44.07). A person may not ROUCit for a charitab1e as.c;ocia-
tion unless it maintains records of receipt!'! and disbursements. 
(§ 44.08) SolicitorR must have the written authorization of 
the organizations they represent. (§~ 44.10. 44.11.) They 
must exhibit their information card to the prospective donee 
when soliciting (§ 44.12), and file a comp1ete report of their 
activities with the board (~44.14). The~' must give receipts 
to donees stating various facts. (§ 44.15.) Violation of the 
ordinance is made punishab1e as a crime. 
In support of its declaration of the validity of these pro-
visions, the majority opinion states that they confer upon 
the department no authority to withh01d information cards 
when the requirements are met. and it cannot be assumed 
that the department will abuse its authority in order to with-
hold them. This is true, but it is also apparent that a pro-
cedure so complex and so costly in time and effort will, so 
far as many solicitors are concerned, be prohibitive. It i..~ 
said in the Cantwell case (310 U.S. 296. 305) that "The 
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, 
which does not involve any religious test and does not un-
reasonably obstruct or de1ay the collection of funds, iR not 
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collec-
tion be for a religious purpose." Assuming that the provisions 
above quoted do not involve any religious test, nevertheless 
/ 
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they are so demanding as not only to open the door to un-
reasonable dela~' and abuse of discretion, but also as pos~jhly 
to bar certain ('IMlses of solicitors found among the "little 
people." Obviously, they do unreasonably obstruct ann delay 
the collection of funds 
Still more restrictive provisions of the ordinance apply to 
so-called ··pro¥loters." who are defined as "any person who 
for pecuniary compensation ~l consideration received, or t.o 
be received. solicit~ or is engaged in the business of or holds 
himself out to the publiC as engaged in the busines~ of Roliclt-
ing contributions for or on behalf of any other person or 
any charitable association, corporation or institution, or con-
ducts, manages, or carries on ..• or if! engaged in the busi-
ness of or holds himself out as engaged 1n the bmdness of 
conducting, managing or carrying on any drive or campaign 
for any such purpose; provided. howe,rer. that pecuniary 
compensation or consideration as used herein. shall include, 
but shall not be limited to, participation on a percentage basis 
in any fund solicited, or raised, for or on behalf of any 
other person. firm, association or corporation: provided, 
further, that no person who ill a bone fide paid officer or 
employee of a social service agency endorsed by the Board 
of Social Service Commis.."!ioners, shall be considered a pro-
moter within the meaning of this article." (§ 44.01. ) 
Section 44.19, subdivision 1, provides that "No promoter 
shall in any manner whatsoever, solicit within the City of 
Los Angele."! any contribution for any actual or purported 
charitable use, purpose, association, corporation or institution 
without license from the Board so to do." 
Subdivision 2. entitled "Application." states that "To ob-
tain such license, such promoter shall make and file with 
the Board an application therefor in writing. In such ap-
plication, the applicant shall set forth. in addition to· such 
information as may be required by the Board: (a) The 
name and address of the applicant. . . . (b) A !l1lccinct 
statement of facts showing that the applicant ... is of 
good character and reputation. . . • (c) The general plan, 
character and method in or by which the applicant proposes 
to conduct its or his business as a promoter." 
Subdivision 3 is entitled "Bond." and states: "At the 
time of 80 filing with the Board an application for such 
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the Board a good and sufficient bond in the aggregate sum 
of ••• $2,000 running to the City of LOR Angeles for the 
use and benefit of interested persons and parties. . . . Said 
bond shall be conditioned upon the strict compliance, by the 
Principal, with the provisions of )his Article and the pay-
ment of any direct pecuniary loss sustained, through any 
act of grand or petty theft on the part of the Principal, 
by any donor pr by any person on whose behalf the funds 
or personal property were solicited or 'Teceived by the 
Principal. . . ." 
Subdivision 5, entitled "Investigation," provides that "The 
Board shall examine such application and shall make such 
further investigation of the applicant and its or his affairs 
as the Board shall deem advisable. If from such exami-
nation the Board shall be satisfied: (a) That the applicant 
is of good character and reputatiOll. . . . (b) That appli-
cant has sufficient financial responsibility to carry out the 
obligations incident to any solicitation such applicant may 
make within the City of Los Angeles as such promoter and 
that all of the statements made in such application are and 
each of them i~ true and that ... applicant .•• has (not) 
violated any of the provisions of this Article or has (not) 
engaged in any fraudulent transaction or enterprise, and 
that the applicant intends to conduct its business fairly 
and honestly, the Board shall issue to the applicant a li-
cense to solicit as a promoter within the City of Los An-
geles, contributions. Otherwise, the Board shall deny the 
application and refuse to issue a license, and shall notify 
the applicant of the decision of the Board .... " 
Under the heading "Revocation," subdh'ision 6 states that 
.. All licenses issued hereunder shall be subject to the con-
dition that the applicant thereafter shall cease and desist 
from acting as a promoter within said City of Los Angeles 
when ordered so to do by the Board if the Board finds after 
a hearing . . . that any act or omission of such promoter 
.•. in making any solicitation or in the conduct of the busi-
ness of promoter within the City of Los Angeles is unfair, 
unjust, inequitable or fraudulent. The Board must suspend 
or revoke any such license if, after hearing upon notice, the 
Board shall find the existence of any of the grounds herein-
above enumerated for the denial of an application for a pro-
moter's license; provided, however, that such suspension 
or revocation shall be discretionary with the Board if the 
/ 
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only ground for such rC\'ocatioll is such that it does not 
affect tbe licensee's honesty and integrity, or bis ability 
properly to perform his duties as a promoter." 
Subdivision 7 deals with "Termitiation" of licenses at the 
close of each fiscal; year, and snbdivision 8 with "Funds." 
The latter subdivision provides that "No promoter shall 
commingle any 'hontribution with the promoter's own funds 
or property, or fail at any time to mai~tain and keep all 
contributions separate 8Jld apart from the promoter's own 
funds or property .... \:-3) It shall be unlawful for any 
promoter to cause or permit any person for pecuniary com-
pensation or consideration received or to be received by such 
person to solicit or receive on his behalf or at his instigation, 
under his direction or control or in his employment, any 
contribution unless such person shall be registered as a 
solicitor by the Board. (b) No person shall be so registered 
as a solicitor unless he shall first appear personally before 
the Board and furnish satisfactory proof that he is a person 
of good moral character, that his reputation for honesty is 
good and unless he first file with the Board and thereafter 
maintain a bond satisfactory to the Board in the sum of 
... $500.00, conditioned for the payment of any direct 
pecuniary loss which may be sustained by the promoter, by 
any donee, or by any person on whose behalf any contribu-
tion was solicited or received, through any act of grand 
or petty theft, committed by such person. (c) The pro-
visions of paragraphs b, c, d, and e of subsection 3, above, 
shall apply to bonds filed pursuant to this subsection. (d) 
The Board shall collect a fee of ... $1.00 for each such 
registration. . . ." I ' 
The comment which has been made concerning the un- i 
reasonableness of the ordinance provisions relating to solici. 
tors applies with double force to tbese "promoter" provisions, 
and tbey are also subject to additional criticism. 
From the definition of a "promoter," as heretofore quoted 
(§ 44.01, supra), it appears that the term is not confined to 
business solicitors, such as cmployees of a promotion agency 
handling fund raising campaigns, but includes any person 
who for pecuniary compensation solicits for another. Many 
solicitors for charity are indigent religionists. As an integral 
part of the exercise of their religious right they solicit 
funds in support of their cause and the charitable activities 
incident to it, and of necessity they retain some portion of 
) 
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the money collected m order that they themselves may be 
clothed and fed. To impose·; upon this class the burden 
of posting a $2,000 bond,,pf paying a license fee, and of 
showing sufficient financiaf respomdbility to carry out the 
obligations incident t'O their solicitation is to seriously im-
pede, if not prohjbit, their undertakings at the outset. A 
required qualification of financial &'tanding sufficient to enable 
such an applicant to post a $2,000 bond will lleither insure 
honesty nor creatc a deterrent against fraud. In many cults 
and religions it is traditional that poverty and saintliness 
shall walk hand in hand. Many creeds view the possession 
of property and assets, or of more money than necessary 
for bare essentials, as a manifestation of sins of worldliness. 
Yet history shows that some of the finest deeds of charity 
and most unselfed works known to man have been ac-
complished by adherents of these views. It is thus 8 dan-
gerous legislation which would impede the charitable im-
pulses and hamper the undertakings of all but the financially 
able-which would give to men of property but deny to the 
poor the right equally possessed by both to develop and 
carry out the tenets of their creed. 
The fee of $25 may not seem large but when it is combined 
with the expense and difficulty of obtaining a bond (if in-
deed such could be obtained by an indigent religionist even 
if the premium were paid for him), and establishing the 
vague condition of "financial responsibility," it involves cu-
mulative burdens too heavy to be borne. In seeking to justify 
its declaration of the reasonableness of these provisions, the 
majority opinion states that the filing of a bond is "a com-
mon requirement in the regulation of occupations or activi-
ties involving the handling of entrusted funds," and that 
"The license fee is a reasonable one, covering the expenses 
of investigations and administration" (p. 20). This latter 
statement may have been inspired by the fact that the late 
federal decisions speak of the distinction between a license 
fee solely to defray the costs of enforcement of a regulatory 
statute and one for revenue purposes, condemning only the 
latter. But here, even if the regulatory provisions of the or-
dinance were otherwise reasonable as applied to religionists 
and justified the imposition of a fee sufficient to meet the 
costs of administration, there is no indicll.tion whatsoever that 
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application or that that sum was fixed in contemplation of 
reimbursement for expenses. 
The following excerpt from Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105, pp. 111-113 [63 S.Ot. 8'70, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 
146 A.L.R. 81], is pertinent: "It is plain that a religious 
organization needs funds to remain a going concern .... 
Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, fre~dom of religion 
are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own 
way .... Those who can tax the exercise of this religious 
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the 
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax 
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangel-
ism can close ibl doors to all those who do not have a full 
purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honor-
able manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can 
deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from 
them a part of the vital power of the press which has sur-
vived from the Reformation. • . . In all of these cases the 
issuance of the permit or license is dependent on the pay-
ment of a license tax. And the license tax is fixed in amount 
and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or 
to their realized revenues. It is not a nominal fee imposed 
as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing 
the activities ill question. It is in no way apportioned. It 
is a :fiat license tax levied and collected as a condition to 
the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance 
those constitutional liberties of press and religion and in-
evitably tends to suppress their exercise. . • . So, it may 
not be said that proof is lacking that these license taxes either 
separately or cumulatively have restricted or are likely to 
restrict petitioners' religious activities. On their face they 
are a restriction of the free exercise of those freedoms which 
are protected by the First Amendment ..•• Itinerant evan-
gelists moving throughout a state or from state to state would 
feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as 
they become fashionable .. The way of the religious dissenter 
has long been hard. But if the formula of this type of or-
dinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of 
religious minorities will have been found. This method of 
disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out 
by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted 
town by town, villa.ge by village. The spread of religious 
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ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry 
of numerous religious groups would be stopped." 
It will further be noted that !pe provision defining "pro-
moters," as heretofore quoted (§ 44.01, supra), includes a 
special exemption runniIig in favor of bona fide paid officers 
and employees of soe'ial service agencies endorsed by the 
board. The conditions which a social service agency must 
meet to secur~ endorsement are set forth in a detailed separate 
ordinance, the relevant porticlt!,s of which are incorporated 
in the majority opinion by marginal reference. One condi-
tion is "(h) That the officers and employees of such cor-
poration or association are persons of good moral character 
and reputation and that the corporation or association has 
exercised reasonable care in selecting persons of good moral 
character and reasonable experience as solicitors for its 
funds." 
Apparently no bonding or license requirement is imposed 
upon these solicitor-employees, or in their behalf upon the 
organization they represent. Thus the solicitors for the or-
ganized charity hold a great primary advantage over the 
unorganized worker, with no sound reason for the discrimi-
nation. Graft and corruption can flourish, and fraud can 
emanate from high places as well as low, and through organi-
zation these evils are sometimes hidden and the more securely 
entrenched. Also the percentage of contribution retained to 
meet the expenses and recompense the employees of charitable 
institutions is apt to be higher than that retained by un-
organized workers or sincere and humble religionists who 
sacrifice all in the practice of their religion. Abuses and 
breaches of trust do occur but who can say that the hazard 
is greater in unorganized classes of workers, whose illicit 
gains are probably small, compared with what is lost when 
a large institution becomes permeated with corruption. 
Vital need exists for the individual as well as for the or-
ganized worker in both charitable undertakings and general 
benefits derived from the spreading of religious doctrines. 
There are many dark places where the light of organized 
charity does not penetrate-many needy whom it does not 
reach. To these people the tender ministrations of sincere 
and unfettered religionists bring succor and salvation. The 
unreasonable curtailment of this activity merely because some 
are addicted to fraudulent and deceitful practices in the 
name of charity, is as unthinkable as would be the dis-
./ 
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solution of established institutions merely because dishonesty 
and corruption have at tim~ been uncovered in their ad-
Iilinistration. The public jl.s a whole cannot be freed from 
the entire power of gecision as to the worth of the cause 
ror which they are solicited or their inclination to con-
1 ribute. 1f the constitutional p;ua!"~ntees are to be upheld. 
then the puhli(' mm;t expect to bear some portion of the 
Inll"den of seeing that their gifts are mad(' only to worthy 
and honestly administered 'causes. 
Another objectionable provision of the ordinance is that 
wllich requires the promoter to furnish "a succinct state-
ment of facts showing that the applicant __ . is of good 
('hllracter and reputation." Those who contribute to charity 
are not so much concerned with the "reputation" of the 
solicitor as they are with the intended use to which the dona-
tions are to bE' put. A most wicked man of public ill repute 
may espouse a very worthy cause or do a very good deed. 
Religionists and reformers are often called from the gutter 
whence they return to make expiation for their wrongdoings 
by trying to save others from a like fate and to aid the 
redemption of those who may already have strayed. Forceful 
and effective work has been done by the reformed. turned 
reformer. and many of these people labor on without affiliation 
with any recognized institution and without financial help 
other than that g-leaned through solicitation. 
Hence, it would seem that if any statement is to be de-
manded in connection witll a reasonable requirement for 
registration and identification it should embrace no more 
than an averment of present honesty and sincerity in the 
disbursement of money and propert~- for the purpose for 
which they are solicited. Reputation is not an issue. 
The requirement of section 44.19 that the officials may 
make an investigation and if "satisfied" that the applicant is 
of "good character and reputation" they may issue a license. 
places upon the applicant the burden of establishing this 
requirement as a condition precedent to the exercise of his 
right of religious liberty. Such a requirement is not a suf-
ficiently fixed and definite standard to safeguard the free 
exercise of the constitutional right here involved. In the 
exercise of their power the officials might conclude that an 
applicant does not qualify merely because of their opinion 
concerning his particular religious belief and creed. The 
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views his reputation in the eyes of a large group, or a 
majority, may be far from good and his character at least 
questionable if not downright immoral. What fair qualifica-
tion to the right of religious liberty can be conceived which 
limits i1.<; exercu;f' to those who have good reputation and 
character, and denie.<; it to those who haye not? 
It is said in Murdock v. Pennsyl'lJb,tJia, supra (319 U.S. 
105, 116): "Plainly II cOlllmunit~· may 'hot suppress, or the 
state tax, the dissemination of views because they are un-
popular, annoying or distasteful. If that device were ever 
sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument 
for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes 
but whic}] doe.o; not happen to be in favor. That would be a 
complete repudiation . . . of the Bill of Rights." And again 
in Oantwell v. Oonneticut, supra, (310 U.S. 296, 310): "In 
the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, 
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man 
may seem the rankest error t.o his neighpor. To persuade 
others t.o his own point of view. the pleader, as we know, 
at times, resorts t.o exaggeration. t.o vilification of men who 
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even 
to false statement. But the people of this nation have or-
dained in the light of hilrt.ory, that. in spite of the prob-
abilit~· of excesse.'l and abuses. these libertie.q are, in the long 
view. essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on 
the part of thE" citizens of a democracy." 
Subdivision fi of section 44.]9 of the ordinance is also 
subject to criticism. Tt authorizes the revocation of the license 
where the licensee. in making thE' !lolicitation, is unfair, un-
just, inequitable. or fraudulent. Thp,se grounds. except the 
one last stated. arE' vaguE' and uncertain and may well re-
sult in the samE' religiou~ censorship arising from a deter-
mination of good charact.er and reputation. 
Suhdivifdon 8 of the !lection. dealing with the qualifica-
tions of solicitors for promoters, is subject to the same ob-
jections as the rest of the section. The only difference is 
the amount of the fee and the size of the bond. It requires 
a "good moral character." and fI reputation for honesty 
that is good. 
It is not an obstacle to plaintiff's attack on seetion 44.19 
that it has not sought a license or that if the publie officials 
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The section on its face operates BB a prior censorship on 
the free exercise of religious liberty; (Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, supra.) 
There is another ordinance which concerns the regulation 
of pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers, and junk dealers (Lo..'1 
Angeles Municipal Code. § 24.0,1), Although its provisions 
must be considel'£d in relation t<1" the operation of the store 
or so-called industrial department of plaintiff. the subject 
need not be developed here, for from thl' evidence it is clear 
that the store partakes of .. enough of the character of a com-
mercial enterprise to justify the restrictions imposed. In 
the main I can concur in the conclusions (although not the 
reasoning upon which they are based). expressed in the 
majorit~· opinion with respect to this phase of the case. The 
store is not conducted as a profiit making institution but it 
is in the business of selling used property. The operations 
of junk dealers and pawnbrokers have long been recognizeCl. 
as a distinct class of business b'Ubject to regulation under the 
police power in order to facilitate the recovery of stolen prop-
erty and the preservation of health. (See 43 C.J. pp. 389-
ano; 43 ld. 410-411; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law. § 189.) 
It is not contended that the regulatory provisions of sec-
tion 24.01 are invalid if considered apart from the question 
of thl' guarantee of religious liberty. Even BBsuming that 
the s~ction mUb1: be viewed in the light of the right of free 
exercise of religion, there '1eems to be nothin!! arbitrary 
or um'eusona ble in its regulatory requirement.'1. The measure 
is patentl~' II police regulation and the specified fee is not a 
tax for revenue. That fee doe..<: not have combined with it 
the other financial burdens imposed under the ordinance 
dealinlZ with promoters and hence it i.<: distinguishable, More-
over. the operat.ion of the more has most of the aspects of 
an ordinary commercial enterprise. 
Such ordinance (I.Jo..<: Angeles Municipal Code, § 24.01) 
provides that persons who are to engage in the regulated 
busine..'Is mU!~t annually apply for and receive a written per-
mit. Under subsection (c). entitled "Requisites of Pennits," 
it specifie.... the followinJ! requirements or "Rt8.ndards": (1) 
The original application must state "by street and number 
the place where such business is proposed to be conducted" 
or, in the case of junk collecton; having no fl~ed place of 
business, "their residence by street number." The appUca-
) 
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tion "shaH be signed by the applicant and Hhall contain his 
residence address." (2) The payment in advance of an an-
nual fee of $25 ($50, if jewelry. watche!-> "or similar Hec-
ondhand merchandise" is to be dealt in). (3) Upon receipt 
of the application "the Boa?dshall cause to be investigateil 
the business of t.1re applicant and location at which applicant 
proposes to engage in busine.c;s as specified in said applica-
tion. Thereaft.er the Boaril rna:\, issne a permit ... for the 
remaining portion of t.he 'Nlfrcnt' ~·ear." (4) Persons operat-
ing under the ordinancE' must "ciernre an annu:11 renewal 
of su(>h permit commencing .lanua~- 1st of t.he c;ucceeding 
year." (5) Persons holding "an orrlina~'" permit must 
apply for and secure a "special penn it. " "in t.he manner 
provided ... for securing ordina~' permits." beforE' ilea ling 
in "!'Iecondhand jewelry. precion~ .. 1 on es. prec.iou~ metals. 
. . . watches or other similar seconilhanrl merchandise." 
Further regulation!': or "stanrlarrls" !let b~' the ordinance 
incluile the following: "The Boaril <;hall not grant any per-
mit ... to persons who fail. refm~e or negle(>t to comply 
with the laws and ordinanceI': relating to anil regulating the 
business for which !'IUch permit iFl sou!!ht": "If pel'!'lons hold-
ing permits . . . shaH "iolnte any of t.hE' provi!':lons of t.his 
Section [the Municipal 00de !lection "Iettin!! forth the or-
dinance in quec;tion 1 or any provision of any other ordinance, 
or any law relating to 01' regulating any !luch busineR-c;. or 
shall conduct 01' carry on !'IUch bu.sineR.s in an unla'wful man· 
ner, the Board ... shall revoke !'IUch permit." but only upon 
following the proce.dure "in the manner provided in Sec-
tion 22.02 nf this Code" (whieh proceilure lS not flue<;tioned); 
permh holde~ ushall filE' (hlily reports. on fonn!! provideo 
by the Chief of Poli(>e. listin!! the merchandi"e received or 
purchased on the pree.eding- da~·. t.he hour of !'IUch re(>eipt 
or purchase, the "trl1(, name and addr('$s of the party making 
the sale. delivery or pled~e aFI nearly 81'1 the Rame iFl known 
to or can be ascert.a.ined by mch pel'!'lon together with a de-
scription of such party." thE' number of the pawn t.ieket 
issued. if a pledge i!! involv('d. and the amount loaned. and 
a description of each article pledged. received 01' purchased. 
The permit holder is also refjuired to keep "a complete rec-
ord of all goaW . . . pledged to or purchased or received 
by him" which record "Rha 11 be open at all times during busi-
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The mentioned provision!': (and the same i!': true of the 
further provision~ not herein epitomized) are not unreason-
abl~ or uncertain. Subs1antially nothing more is required 
for an original permit than th~ payment of the moderat.e 
fee and the filing. of the written and signed application giving 
the data a~ to tlie location of the proposco hnsine~~ and the 
applicant'~ Ti'!ime and re.<;idenee adilres!':. Th(' requircment!': 
for complianre with law anil t.he keeping and tiling of re-
ports. etr .. after comIlJencing husiness. nre reasonahly related 
to t.he nature of th(' blJl;;iness fmil t.he purpo!':es of the regula-
tions. These latter provisions furnish a proper and exclusive 
standard for guidanre of the board in passing on applications 
for renewal!: of permit.s or proreedinrrs to re,roke permits. 
The very moderate requirements for ori~rinal iSS1UtnCe of per-
mits, hereinabove set forth. leave little if anything, beyond 
the RllitabiHty of the proposeil location. to the dhlcretion of 
the board. This orilinance fullv meets the const.itutional re-
quirement." that regulatory' law~ of this type establish reason-
able standardl'l for the guidance of the permit-isRlling board. 
Defendans contend t.hat injunctive relief il'l not !l.vailable 
to plaintiff and that there is no showing of irreparable injury. 
Generally. publir office~ may be enjoined from enforcing 
an unconstitutiona.l statute. and !!ection 526 (4) of the Code 
of Civil Proceilnre and Reetion ~424 (4) of the Civil Code 
have no application t.o !!\lch !'Iituations. (Brock v. Superior 
Court, 12 Ca1.2d 605 f86 P.2d 8051: Rueneman v. City of 
Santa Barbara, 8 Ca1.2d 40fi f65 P.20 884. 109 A.hR. 8951.) 
Where a criminal <;tatute or ordinance causes irreparable 
damage to property rights. the injureil party may attack 
its constitutionality in an 8ction t.o enjoin its enforcement. 
(See Jones v. City of Los An.qeles, 2]] Cal. ~04 r295 P 14]; 
Sullivan v. San Francisco Oas etc. Co .. 148 Cal. 368 f83 
P. 156, 7. Ann.Cas. !l74. 3 L.R.A.N.R 4011: 1.0s Angeles T. 
Ins. Co. v. Los Angeles. 52 Cal.App. 152. 156 f]98 P. 1001]; 
San Diego T. Ins. Assn. v. East .~an Diego, 186 Cal. 252 r200 
P. 393. 17 A.L.R 5131; and Abbey Land etc. Co. v. San Ma-
teo, 167 C81. 434. 438 f]39 P. 1068. Ann.CaR. ]915C 804. 52 
L.R.A.N.R 508].) 
An interference with the solicitation by plaintiff of con-
tributions is an interference with its property rights in the 
sense that its right to collect and then use the funds will be 
impeded. Even if it be aSSllmed that no injury to property 
rights is threatened, it seems that injunctive relief would 
) 
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be appropriate to restrain the enforcement of. a criminal 
statute where the attack thereon conRiRtR of a bona fide claim 
that the statute violates one of the personal liberties guar-
anteed by the ConRtitution, and that claim is not wholly 
lacking in merit on its face. In...such case the injury con-
sists of the consequenceR of the enforcement of the law to 
the person, viewed in the light of the exalted Rtanding of 
the conRtitutional guarantee..c;. These cbllsequences under 
the procedur~ in this state are serious. '. 
A violatiOli' of the ordinance being a misdemeanor, the 
ca:Je would be cognizable only in an inferior court. From 
that court the only appeal available is to the superior court, 
or to its appellate department. If that court denied relief 
plaintiff would have no recourse to thiR court or the district 
court of appeal by appeal or certiorari, although in the event 
of being imprisoned he would have the remedy of habeas 
corpus. (Portnoy v. SU1)erior Cow·t, 20 Ca1.2d 375 [125 
P.2d 487].) The cases heretofore ci1ec1 are not determinative 
of the point. They merely state the rule that injunctive re-
lief will be given if injury to property rights is threatened. 
That does not exclude such relief where the injury is to 
personal rights. 
It has been recognized that personal rights may be pro-
tected by equity, and they obviously should be, as they are 
more sacred than property rights. It is said in 28 American 
Jurisprudence, Injunctions, section 71: "However, there have 
always been some clearly defined exceptions to the general 
rule, and there is a progressive tendency on the part of the 
courts to remedy by injunction, injuries to personal rights. 
This is, perhaps, as it should be, because the personal rights 
of citizens are more sacred and, by every test, of more value 
than things that may be measured by a purely monetary 
standard, and the courts have expressed difficulty in under-
standing why injunctive protection of the one class of rights 
should be placed above similar protection of the other. It 
lllr.y be added that the courts with great uniformity base their. 
jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights by injunction 
nominally on an alleged property right, where in fact no 
property rightR are invaded, so that the rule seems to be 
one of those known chiefly by its breach rather than its 
observance." (See, also, 14 A.L.R. 295.) Section 526 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure does not limit the injury to property 
rights. On the contrary it authorizes an injunction where 
) 
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th(' acts would produce great or irreparable injury "to a 
party to the action." (Italics ours.) (See Na,tion v. Chism, 
154 Okla. 50 [6 P.2d 7661.) 
For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion that 
the judgment of the trial-"court should be modified by re-
stricting the injunctive relief to alJeged violations of all pro-
visions of the Municipal Code here involved except section 
24.01 which I b~lieve to be valid." '" 
Schauer, J., concurreq.. , 
" 
EDMONDS, J.-In this case, the trial court, upon undis-
puted evidence, found that the Gospel Army was soliciting 
donations for the purpose of furthering its religious activi-
ties. Because these fund.q are used in part for the pur-
pose of giving relief to persons in distress, Mr. Justice Tray-
nor declares, as a matter of law, its activities are charitable 
and not religious. I cannot concur in that conclusion, nor in 
the construction of the Los Angeles Municipal Code as requir-
ing the issuance of permits to either organizations or promot-
ers without an appraisal of "the nature or worthiness of a 
religious cause." And if, contrary to the evidence and find-
ings of the trial court, the Gospel Army, as a matter of law, 
is a charitable institution, then, by the challenged ordinance 
it is arbitrarily denied the right to exist unless it complies 
with undisclosed standards of the commissioners and carries 
on its operationR in accordance with arbitrary and unreason-
able regulations. 
AB Mr. Justice Henshaw pointedly stated in considering 
an earlier ordinance of the city of Los Angeles, which, like 
the one now before the court, gave municipal authorities broad 
and arbitrary power over every institution ministering to 
human suffering and spiritual need, charity is a fundamental 
part of religion. Speaking of the work of the Salvation Army, 
he said: "Profoundly impressed with the Founder's sym-
pathy for the poor and afflicted, and with His teachings that 
'Now abideth faith, hope and charity, these three, but the 
greatest of these is charity,' and 'Now, the end of the com-
mandment is charity out of a pure heart,' it has made its 
special field of religious work the relief of the destitute and' 
the rescue of society's outcasts. It has found that it cannoti 
lead the spirit of the weary and heavy burdened without first: 
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live by bread only,' he cannot live at all without bread. There-
fore, the charitable organizations of the Salvation Army are 
vital, integral parts 01 its religious life ano work." (In re 
Dart, 172 Cal. 47, ~ [155 P. 63, Ann.Cas. 1917D 1127, L.R.A. 
1916D 905).) 
The Gospel Army also endeavors to gain converts for its 
religious doctrines and carfies on actiYities which minister to 
material need. Th& expense aT conducting its work is largely 
met by donations of money and secondhand goods !ilolicited 
from the public. The net proceeds from each of these main 
sources of income go into the Army's treasury from which is 
paid the cost of religious services, free distribution of tracts 
and religious literature, as well as food, lodging, clothing and 
other necessaries for those in need. The record discloses no 
segregation of such funds on the books of the Army as being 
for a religious or for a charitable purpose. Upon this evidence 
the trial court found that if the Gospel Army is required to 
comply with the provisions of the ordinance, such enforce-
ment "will amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of their 
religious activities within the meaning of the Constitution of 
the United States. • . ." Mr. Justice Traynor sweeps aside 
the evidence and the trial court's findings upon the ground 
that, as a matter of law, charity has no place in religion, and 
whenever an organization carrying on religious activities steps 
aside from the promulgation of its spiritual doctrines to ex-
tend a helping hand by the alleviation of human suffering, it 
becomes subject to onerous and restrictive regulations. So nar-
row a view of the practice of religion runs counter to all 
of the fine principles of human conduct which, more and more, 
are leading men of good will to help those less fortunate along 
the daily path. A religious man, it has been said, is one "whose 
light shines in the dark places of the earth through righteous 
acts and helpful deeds." 
Large groups of citizens of every faith and creed are reg-
ularly devoting much time and effort, at great personal sac-
rifice, to the cause of those who are in need. If the work in 
behalf of the less fortunate among us is done in the name of 
or in connection with the promulgation of a religious doc-
trine, then the Los Angeles ordinance authorizes the Depart-
ment of Social Service to add to the indifference, inertia and 
self-interest which solicitation must always overcome, either 
the condemnation or damnation by faint praise of an offirial 
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rcgal'd to anything but the personal opinion of some admin-
istrative officcI' as to t lIe wOl'l hinr~:s of the purpose. Whatever 
is done in the name 'of religion for a charitable purpose, the 
ordinance declares in effect, is to be viewed with suspicion 
and distrust. 1'here can be preaching without official inter-
vention, but any pr~ctice of Christian virtues is to be carried 
on only under tKe watch/1M eye of the Department of Social 
Service according to its notions of "the public interest." And 
yet my associates say that such legislation lays no restraint 
upon religious freedom. ' .... 
It is, of course, true that reasonable regulations may be 
imposed upon an organization carrying on religious activities. 
The rule, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
is that "The general regulation, in the public interest, of solic-
itation, which does not involve any religious test and does not 
unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not 
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collec-
tion be for a religious purpose." More specifically, the court 
declared that" A state may protect it.o; citizens from fraudu-
lent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, 
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any pur-
pose, to establish his identity and authority to act for the cause 
which he purports to represent." (Oantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, at pp. 304, 306 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 
A.L.R. 1352].) 
But the ordinance here challenged goes far beyond these 
limits. As the statute reads, its provisions shall not be appli-
cable "to solicitations made solely for evangelical, missionar~·, 
or religious purposes." These terms are not defined, yet the 
lawmakers provided "that in any case where it shall come 
to the attention of the Board that any solicitation has been 
or is being intended to be made for evangelical, missionary 
or religious purposes but in such manner as in the opinion of 
the Board is calculated to give or may give the impression 
to the person or persons solicited in an~T such solicitation or 
to the public that the purpose of such solicitation is either 
in whole or in part charitable. then the Board, if in its 
opinion the public interest will be subserved thereby, shall 
investigate the matter of such solicitation and give publicity 
to its findings thereon in such manner as it may deem best to 
advise the public of the facts of the case." (§ 44.16.) If this 
curious language means anything, it extends the exemption 
to an~T solicitation in behalf of a religious organization for a 
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of Social Commissioner~ to ~tatr. to the public, "in such man-
ner as it may deem best," its official disapproval of any such 
practical application of the Mru;;ter's teachings to human need 
or of the methods by which help is being extended. Under that 
construction of the exemption provision, no license for the 
appellant's solicit'ations mny be refJuired. But it probabl~' 
would be morl disast.rous to the work of a religious organiza· 
tion to arbitrarily and publicly condemn its activities than t.o 
require it to obtain a license, and equaIly violative of consti-
tutional guarantees. '\ 
Considering the provisions of the ordinance from the 
standpoint that, under its express terms, only solicitation for 
contributions to meet the expense of doctrinal church activi-
ties is exempt from regulation, although the good works done 
by an organization such as the Gospel Army are, to borrow 
Mr. Justice Henshaw's words. ",·it.al. integral parts of its re-
ligious life and work," no person may solicit a contribution 
for its sUPPArt who has not obtained an "information card." 
Such a card is issued by the Department of Social Service only 
following the filing of a "notice of intention" to solicit, 
which shall include the detailed information specified by sec-
tion 44.05 of the code. (Ante, p. 251.) This information is 
not limited to facts relating to the identity of the proposed 
solicitor and his authority to act for a particular organiza-
tion. Also there must be submitted detailed information re-
lating to the organization's purpose and business affairs and 
those who are supporting it financially or employed in its ae-
tivities. In short, all of the data demanded concern the mer-
its of the cause which is asking the public for assistance and 
the scope of the work it is carrying on. 
Moreover, the information card which allows one to solicit, 
providing he presents it to the person who is approachced for 
a donation, "allowing him sufficient opportunity to read the 
same, before accepting any contribution .... " (§ 44.12), is 
not issued as of CQurse upon the filing of the notice of inten-
tion. There is neither requirement nor even suggestion in 
the ordinance to support Mr. Justice Traynor's assertion that 
these cards, "which are in effect permits to solicit, are issued 
automatically upon the filing of the required information and 
the payment of the 4¢ for each card." On the contrary, the 
Department of Social Service shall have the power: "(a) To 
investigate the allegations of the Notice of Intention, or any 
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make copies of all books, records and papers of such person, 
by or on whose behalf any solicitation is made; (c) To inves-
tigate at any time the methods of making or conducting any 
such solicitation ..... " (§ 44.03.) 
A majority.of the court sanction the indefinite terms of 
the ordinancE'·' relating to the issuance of a permit upon the 
pre!>umption that the Board of Social Service Commissioners 
will fairly investigate the facts in' oonnection with each appli-
cation and prompt.ly make a determination upon them. It may 
not be assumed, say mv associates. that the board will whim-
sically or caprlcio~sly' deny an application. and the courts 
will relieve from unjust and arbitrary action. The same argu-
ment was advanced by the state in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
supra, and summarily rejected. The opportunity to obtain 
judicial correction, said Mr .• Justice Roberts, speaking for 
the court, does not justify interference with constitutional 
rights. " ... The availability of a judicial remedy for abuse..q in 
the system of licensing st.ill leaves that system one of previoUR 
restraint which, in the field of free speech and press. we have 
held inadmissible. A statute authorizing previous restraint 
upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial deci-
sion after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one pro-
viding for like restraint by administrative action." (p. 306.) 
Moreover. the inQuisitorial authority of the department is 
a continuing one. "Whenever. in the opinion of the Board 
of Social Service Commissioners t.he Notice of Intention does 
not disclose sufficient information for the public concerning 
the facts ... reqnired to be stated in such Notice or concern-
ing the person or association making such solicitation or on 
whose behalf such scolicitation is made. then. upon the request 
of said Department. there shall be filed. in writing, within 
forty-eight (48) hours after such request, such additional 
information as may be required by said Board upon the fore-
going subjects." (~44.06.) This right may be exercised after 
the Board has made an investigation. and there is no limita-
tion upon the time within which inquiries must be concluded. 
Also, there is no restriction upon the number of additional 
requests the board may make for information. or any time 
fixed in the ordinance to prevent the board from taking months 
~ look into the purpose and scope of an organization's activi-
ties; designed delay is invited by the censorious terms of 
the legislation, and the widests discretion is given to harass, 
condemn, delay and obstruct. And if perchance the appli-
) 
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cant represents an unpopular cause, then the authority of the 
Board of Social Service Commh;sioners to publish the results 
of its investigation~ "l,).y such means as may be deemed best 
to reach the general public and persons interested" (§ 44.02) 
gives opportunity for the l1n(\ermining of public confidence 
and provides a vehiele for offieinl propaganda which may do . ' irreparable damage. . 
Occasion for discrimination is also afforded by sp.ction 
44.03 which allows the. Department of Social Service to issue 
an information card in h form st.ating either that the authori-' 
zation given doe..c; or does not constitute an endorsement of 
the charitable association for which solicit.ation is to be made. 
Moreover, the information card may show the pertinent facts 
set forth in the notice of intention and any additional infor-
mation "as shall in the opinion of the Board be of assistance 
to the public to determine the nature and worthines::; of the 
purpose for which the solicitation is made .... " The infor-
mation card which the solicitor must carry with him, and 
either read to each prospective contributor or present to such 
person for his perusal. allowing him sufficient time to read 
it before accepting any donation, may therefore be a sizable 
volume of data which in practice, if not in purpose, will effec-
tively block public support of an organization which has a 
legitimate purpose and against whieh no criticism justly may 
be made. 
To meet the demands of the city, the receipt required for 
each donation must be signed by the solicitor and contain "in 
addition to a description of the amount and kind of the con-
tribution, RUbstantially the following matters: (a) The name 
of the association, if any, in whose name or upon whose be-
half the solicitation is made. (b) A statement 8.R to whether 
the contribution solicited is to be applied for the r;eneral pur-
poses of RUch association. if any, or for specific purposes, and 
if for specific purpose..~ the nature thereof shall be clearly 
stated. (c) A statement that the Information Card, issued 
by the Department, was presented to the person making the 
contribution for his perusal prior to receipt by the solicitor 
of the contribution receipted for .... " (§ 44.15.) Only by 
means of a traveling office could a solicitor comply with all 
of these requirements. 
AP. justification for his position, Mr. Justice Traynor &8-
serts that "activities characteristic of the secular life of the 
OQ1DUI.uniV may properl,y be a ooneern of the community even 
./ 
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though they are carried o~ by a religioUs organization." A 
host of decisions is cited in support of that statement. But 
the cases relied upon ~re authority only for the proposition 
that certain activities such as the sale of religiom; periodicals 
by minors. beating" a drum on .the traveled portions of the 
city streets. and parades. carr~ed on by a church. are 
subject to reasonable re~lation by the state under its 
police power; they do not J1Urport to declare what may be 
done in the field of reasonable regulation of solicitation for 
religious purposes. Indeed. excluding Tn re Dart, supra, only 
two of them concerned the constitutionality of a statute reg-
ulating the solicitation of funds. One of these two, Prince v, 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 r64 S.Ct. 438. 88 L.Ed. 645], 
upheld a statute restricting the activity of minors. The other 
decision. 'Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. ]05 r63 S.Ct. 
870. 87 hEd. 1292. 146 A.hR. 8] 1. expressly excluded con-
sideration of the question now in controversy, for the court 
declared that there was no iR.crne before it in regard to a reg-' 
istration system for solicitors. 
As to Tn re Dart, supra, the statement from it which is 
quoted in the majority opinion has no application to solicita-
tion for religious work: it concerns the reg'nlation of organi-
zations which seek contributions for charitable purposes. The 
declaration that under the police power. there may be rea-
sonable supervision over persons eng-aged in the occupation of 
obtaining money from the public for the maintenance of an 
organization carrying on charitable work is followed by the 
pronouncement: "Even' person has the right. under our con-
stitution. and perhaps without its g"llarantee. to solicit con-
tributions for a worthy (',haritable purpose. provided he acts 
in good faith and honestl~' applie~ them to that purpose. 
The ordinances give the commission power to deprive per-
sons of that right without cause or reason. To the extent that 
they give thi!" arbitrary power they are contrary' to the con-
stitution and void." (1 n re Dart. supra, at p. 57.) Certainly 
the constitutional g"llarantee give..o: as much, if not greater. 
protection to religious endeavors which include ministration 
to relieve human suffering. For as Jame..<: wrote concerning 
faith without works. "If a brother or Rister be naked. and 
destitute of daily food. And one of you say unto them. De-
part in peace, be ye warmE'd and filled: notwithstanding ye 
give them not those things which are needful to the body; 
what doth it profit" Jas. 2: 5, 16.) 
) 
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But if the practice of religion may be legally isolated 
beyond the contaminating reach of charity, then, in my 
opinion, the legislation is vultlerable to attack as unlawfully 
circumscribing the' activities of every organization which ear-
ries on its work without the profession of religious doctrille. 
Unquestionably the occupation of t.he'·!\plicitation of contrihu-
tions for charitable purpOSeR may be subjertC'd to regulation. 
but legislatures or municipalitjes may not. under the guise 
of the police power. impose unnecessary and unreasonable 
restrict.ions upon t.he use of private propert~' or the pursuit 
of useful activitie.s. (J{r.Kn1! .Jewelers Inc. v. Rowron, 19 
Ca1.2d 595 rI22 P.2d 543. 13n AJ.J.R ]]881: In re Fuller, 
15 Cal.2d 425 f]02 P.2d 3211: Skn7ko v. nit11 of Sunnyvale. 14 
Ca1.2d 213 r93 P.2d 931: Tfl. re Monro1,i.a E1'enifln Post. 199 
Cal. 263 r248 P. ]017): Prost v. City of T,os Angeles. 181 Cal. 
22 [183 P. 342. 6 A.hR. 4681: Ex pnrtc TJirl'MI. 144 Cal. 234 
r77 P. 924. 103 Am.St.Rep 82. 1 Ann. Cas. 428. 66 L.RA. 
9281; Larson v. Bush, 29 Cal.App.2d43 r83 P.2d 9fi51.) 
Also the general and indefinite terms used in the ordinance 
wholly fai1 to meet the constit.utional requirement that a 
regulatory statute mllst Rpecify II standnrd for offici a I a('tion. 
(In re Dart, supra: Hewitt v. Statf' Roard of Medica} Ex-
aminers. 148 Cal. 590. fi93 fR4 P. 39. 113 Am.fh.Rep. 315. 
7 Ann.Cas. 750. 3 L.RA.N.S. ~961: Schae.zlein v. (!ananiss, 
135 Cal. 466. 469 r67 P. 7!'i5. R7 Am}=lt..Rep. ]22. fi6 L.R.A. 
733]; Oount'J.I of Lo.~ Anrrel('.s v. Holl111ftood C('.me.ter1/ Assn., 
124 Cal. 344. 349 f57 P. 153. 71 Am.~t.Rep. 751: 1i:x parte 
Sing Lee. 96 Cal 3M. ~59 r::n P. 245. 31 Am.St.Rep. 218, 
24 L.R.A. ]951: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ]1~ U.S. 356 [6 RCt. 
1064. 30 L.Ed. 2201: Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. Grafld Rapids, 260 
Mich. 447 r245 N.W. 5091.) 
The provisions of the Municipal Code which have been 
8UIJlmarized in ~onnection with the discus..o;ion concerning their 
application to the ~harita bJe work of a religious organization 
effectively hamper and restrict any endeavor to better the 
lot of tho~e in need of material aid and comfort if that effort 
dOeR not conform to an undiRclosed !It.andard. The work of 
every organizat.ion mum meet the approval of the depart-
ment: Rllch as do not. are unfit t.o live. Moreover. in it.s prac-
tical aspects the ordinance is particularly burdensome upon 
organizations sllch 8S the Gospel Army. which continually 
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for any ch!lritahle purposr must. file with the Department 
wit.hin ~o nays after the elosr of any '111ch solil'itation or 
witl1in 30 oa:v~ llfter a 00mnnn therefor b:v thE' Department 
a rrnort to t.hE'.)1epartnfrnt 'ltatin~ thE' contri1mtjon~ scrnred 
from or a~ a result of an~' o;11l'h 'lolil'it~tion. ann in nrt-ail 
all !'xpensE'S of or connectE'n \\-ith 'l11(·h '101il'itntion. ann '1how-
in,., exaetl:v for what \l"~<: ann in'wllRt mrnner :Ill snch con-
trihution~ were or are to be nishurs(>n or Cljstribnteo." 
(§ 44.14. ) What constitute!" "the "losl' of any such solicita-
tion'" And to what extent mmrt thl' organi:r.ation '1how 
"exactlv for what use~ ant'! in what manner all !Inch con-
tributi~ns were or are to be oisbut'!led or distrihuted~" Is 
every person who is a beneficiar:v of thl' org'ani:r.ation'~ help-
fulness to be named? Is the valuE' of th!lt aid to be !It.aled 
in terms of money or !lPiritual comfort.? MU!lt a suh!>t.antial 
part of the effort intended for hllman hetterment h(> devoted 
to making reports to a ~overnmental agency !let upon the 
minute and continuing supervision of all I"haritab1e act.ivi-
tie!l? 
Very obviously, the purpose of these reports is to provide 
a basis for keeping each organi:r.ation within the range of a 
policy which is not stated in the ordinance and may be as 
variable as differin/! views upon permi!l!lible bound!l of !locial 
service. For an information card may be recalled by the 
board upon receipt of data which. in its opinion. !lhall render 
incorrect any matement set forth in t.hat nocument. Under 
such circumstances. the board shall amend or correct the 
card. or issue 8 new one in accordance with the additional 
datil obtained. But impliedl~' each card is to be i!'l..'1ued for 
a period which need not be uniform as to all applicant.'l. 
and is valid only during that time (§ 44.02). Under those 
provisions, only by carrying' on it.'l work in accordance with 
the views of the Board of Social Service Commissioners, and 
making reports in !lUch detail as to satisfy demands which 
cannot be mea!IUred against any standards set by law, may 
an or/!anization continue. 
Also. there is no standard or limitation provided in regard 
to the data printed npon the information card. As a solicitor 
must show this card to each prospective donor, allowin/! him 
sufficient opportunity to read it before acceptin~ any con-
tribution the board may arbitrarily express disapproval of 
a worthy charity or make the information so voluminous that 
solicitation would be effectively blocked. And the unlimited 
) 
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power given to the board to publish the result.s of its in-
yestigations is broad enough to authorize presentation to 
t.he public of confidential data concerning policies and de-
tails of managrmrnt haying..no relation to reasonable licensing 
requirements ;> 
If an organization rUlls t.he WlUntlet of these prc)\"isions 
and is ahle to curry on its work .to the sutisfurtion of the 
official censors of charitahle pnrpose]>, every person whom it 
employs for "pecuniary compensation or ('onsirleration ,. to 
obtain subscriptions from the pub1ir must also secure a lirl'nse. 
The way of an applicant for such a license is 1\ hard one. In 
his application he must set forth. in addition to facts show. 
ing that he "is of good character and reputat.ion, ,. "snrh 
information as may be required by the board." Thereupon. 
thE' board shall make such investigation of the applicant and 
his affairs as it deems adyisable. No Iimitat.ion as to the 
extent of such an investir.ation is imposed and no time is 
fixed within which it must be concluded. Any ground that 
w(\uld have led to a denial of the license ill also ground for 
its revocation. 
If. contrary to the narrow interpretation of religion laid 
down by my associates, human kindness is included in its 
practice, then these provisions governing the licensing of 
individuals to solicit contributions are clearly invalid. for 
they go much further than to lay down a reasonable require-
ment for registration and identification. Indeed, there is 
no statutory statement of the data which an applicant must 
submit, for the specified information is "in addition" to 
that which may be required by the board. The majority 
allows the regulation of solicitation for religious purposes 
to go far beyond the limitation specified by the United States 
Supreme Court in the Cantwell case. supra, by approving 
the requirements that a promoter or solicitor be granted 
a license only if the board is satisfied that he is of good 
character and reputation and equal to the financial responsi-
hility incident to the proposed solicitation; that he file a 
bond and pay a license fee; and that he give II complicated 
form of receipt to each contributor. The provision authoriz-
ing the revocation of II license after II hearing, for any "un-
fair, unjust, inequitable or fraudulent" act or for any ground 
that would have led to a denial of t.he liCl'nst:' also goc!'I far 
beyond the permissible bounds fixed fo1' re~ulatioll of solicita-
,tion for a religious purpose. 
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And construing any organized plan for taking care of 
those in need of material aid as beyond the reach of religiou" 
duty or concern, the licensing provisions which have been 
mentioned in. the next to the last paragraph unreasonably 
restrict the right of an indivic1'u?1 to engage in the business 
of solicitation for charitable purposes and also fail to set 
up a definite standard l"hich the applicant for a license must 
meet. The cases cited by the majority as authority for the 
proposition that a promoter or solicitor may be required to 
submit proof of his good character and reputation stand only 
for the rule that a state may do so in connection with regula-
tion of t.he practice of a profession which requires the posses-
sion of special knowledge, skill and training, or the sale of 
merchandise of a particular character. (Leach v. Daugherty, 
73 Cal.App. 83 [238 P. 160] [broker's certificate under the 
Corporate Securities Act); Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589 
[185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418} [license of real estate broker]; 
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 [20 S.Ot. 633, 44 L.Ed. 
725] [license for sale of cigarettes].) These decisions, in 
my judgment, have no application to legislation laying down 
licensing requirements for the business of soliciting funds for 
charitable purposes. 
A recent controversy in Michigan presented substantially 
the same question as is no'v before this court. An ordinance 
which prohibited the solicitation of contributions or the sale 
of goods "the proceeds from which, or any part thereof, are 
to be used for any so-called charitable purpose" without 
a written permit to be granted by the city manager, when it 
appeared, after investigation ana report by a police officer, 
"that the charity is a worth~' one" and that the applicants 
for a permit "are fit and responsible parties," was held to 
violate the provisions of a state constitution prohibiting de-
privation of life, liberty. or property without due process 
of law. "It is requisite to the validity of the ordinance," 
said the court, "t.hat it should state 'a standard for the 
guidance' of the official who passes upon the application for 
the permit. . . • The general and indefinite teMrul used in 
this ordinance wholly fail to comply with this requisite." 
(Hoyt Bms. Inc. v. Grand Rapids, supra, [128 A.L.R. 1363).) 
Turning to the other provision of the Los Angeles Munic· 
ipal Code which is in controversy, although, generally speak-
ing, the business activities of a religious organization come 
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safety or general wclfal'l: of the public, section 24.01 relating 
to dealers· in secondhand goods"'is also unconstitutional for 
the reason that it sets no standard to which an applicant for 
a license must conform. To carry on th~ business of a "sec· 
ondhand dealer," one must "file an app'Ucation in writing 
with the Board [Qi Police Commissioners] specifying by street 
and number the place where such proposed business is pro-
posed to be conducted or carried on; . . . The application 
shall be signed by the applicant and shall contain his resi-
dence address. Upon receipt of such application the board 
shall cause to be investigated the business of the applicant and 
location at which applicant proposes to engage in business as 
specified in said application. Thereafter the board may issue 
a permit to the applicant which shall be effective for the re-
maining portion of the current year." 
This enactment states no grounds justifying a denial of 
the application, specifies no time within which an investiga-
tion must be made, makes no provision for a hearing upon 
the application, and by the use of the word "may," im-
pliedly allows the board to grant or withhold official favor 
for any reason which whim or fancy may dictate. No standard 
of character or business responsibility is set for the guidance 
of the board nor are there any qualifications specified for one 
desiring to deal in secondhand goods. Such legislation has 
uniformly been held not to measure up to the requirements 
of constitutional guarantees. (In re Dart, supra; Hewitt v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners, supra; Schaezlein v. Ca-
baniss. supra; County of Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery 
Assn., supra; Ex parte Sing Lee, supra: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
supra; Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. Grand Rapids, supra. 
Under these circumstanceS, in my opinion, as the right of 
the Gospel Army and those acting in its behalf to solicit 
contributions for either religious or charitable purposes is a 
property right, the unlawful interference with which will 
cause irreparable injury, the trial court properly enjoined 
the enforcement of the ordinances here challenged (Brock 
v. Superior Court, 12 Ca1.2d 605 [86 P.2d 805]; Bueneman v. 
Oity of Santa Barbara, 8 Ca1.2d 405 [65 P.2d 884, 109 A.L.R. 
895] ), and the judgment should ·be affirmed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 17, 1945. Edmonds, J., Carter J., and Schauer, J., voted 
for a rehearing. 
